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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to section 78-
2a-3(2)(a) and 34A-l-303(6) of the Utah Code. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue in this case is whether this Court should overturn the decisions of the 
Administrative Law Judge, and of the Utah Labor Commission (collectively referred to 
as "Labor Commission") that Petitioner/Appellant Robin F. Burgener ("Burgener") was 
not a disabled person within the meaning of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. This Court 
reviews the Labor Commission's determination of claims under the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act for correctness. See Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm'n, 38 
P.3d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). However, because Burgener is challenging the 
factual determinations made by the Labor Commission supporting the determination that 
Burgener was not disabled, Burgener "must marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Id. 
(quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-106. 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice to take any action 
described in Subsections (l)(a) through (f). 
(a) (i) An employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge, demote, or 
terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of 
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any person 
otherwise qualified, because of: 
. . . (H) disability. 
1 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-102f5). 
Disability is "[a] physical or mental disability as defined and covered by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act." 
42U.S.C. $ 12102. 
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual— 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
In September 1997, Burgener brought a claim of discrimination against LabCorp 
with the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor Division ("UALD") alleging that LabCorp 
had failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations after she had suffered through 
a bout of depression.1 (R. 1-2) In November 1997, LabCorp answered the claim by 
denying that Burgener was a disabled person within the meaning of the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act and by establishing that it had eliminated Burgener's position 
pursuant to a general reduction in force. (R. 6-37) In April 2000, the UALD issued an 
Order and Determination in favor of Burgener. (R. 76-86) In May 2000, LabCorp 
sought an evidentiary hearing by filing a notice of appeal and request for a formal 
evidentiary hearing. (R. 87) In April 2001, after discovery and a hearing on the merits, 
Administrative Law Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse dismissed Burgener's claim on the 
1
 For purposes of this appeal only, LabCorp does not presently dispute that Burgener 
suffered some form of limited depression following the death of her mother in March 
1997. 
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grounds that she "factually and legally failed to qualify as disabled." (R. 603-12) In 
May 2002, Burgener filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission. (R. 
613-31) In August 2002, the Utah Labor Commission upheld Judge La Jeunesse's 
decision. (R. 846-48) In September 2002, Burgener filed with the Utah Labor 
Commission a request for reconsideration. (R. 849-75) In October 2002, the Utah Labor 
Commission again upheld Judge La Jeunesse's decision. (R. 1007-010) In December 
2002, Burgener filed a petition for review with this court. 
Statement Of Facts 
Burgener began working for LabCorp on August 26, 1991 as a medial laboratory 
technician in the Hematology Department. (R. 604) For the majority of the time that 
Burgener worked for LabCorp, she worked a graveyard or swing shift - 8:30 p.m. to 5:00 
a.m. (R. 604) Upon the death of her mother on March 24, 1997, Burgener took 
bereavement leave from March 24-27, 1997. (R. 604) She returned to work that Friday, 
March 28, 1997, was only able to work two hours, and thus did not complete here shift. 
(R. 604) 
On or about April 3, 1997, Burgener sought medical help from her family practice 
physician Dr. Douglas Douville. (R. 604) Dr. Douville prescribed Restoril to help her 
sleep and Valium when she felt anxious, and scheduled follow-up for one week later. (R. 
604, 438-39) During her initial treatment, Dr. Douville recommended that Burgener not 
work at all. (R. 1013 at p. 16.) 
2
 A copy of this order is annexed hereto as Exhibit A in the Addendum. 
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On April 7, 1997, Burgener returned for her follow-up visit with Dr. Douville. (R. 
604-05) She continued to report that she could not concentrate and wanted to take an 
additional week off work. (R. 439, 604-05) Dr. Douville started her on Prozac. (R. 440, 
605) Burgener had no prior history of depression or any other psychological disease or 
disorder. (R. 1013 at p. 18) On April 18, 1997, Dr. Douville continued Burgener on 
Prozac and referred her to psychiatry. (R. 441) 
On April 18, 1997, Burgener received notice of her approval for "Short Term 
Disability" effective March 24, 1997. (R. 605) These benefits continued through 
September 23, 1997. (R. 605) One week later, on April 24, 1997, Burgener reported to 
Dr. Douville that her depression was improving but that "she cannot return to work at 
night. . . and becomes panicky at the prospect of returning to work at night." (R. 442) In 
response, Dr. Douville provided her with a note requesting daytime work and referred her 
to psychiatry and counseling. (R. 442) 
On May 2, 1997, Burgener met with Dr. Donna Castleton, a therapist, through 
LabCorp's Employee Assistance Program. (R. 605) Dr. Castleton reported that 
Burgener "could not concentrate" and diagnosed her with Bereavement, Adjustment 
Disorder, Anxiety, Depression, and Mental and Physical Fatigue. (R. 605) 
On May 13, 1997, Dr. Douville noted that Burgener "feels her depression is doing 
much better but that she continues to be unable to work nights and evenings." (R. 445). 
Dr. Douville summarizes that Burgener's "[depression [is] improving." (R. 445) 
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On June 26, 1997, Burgener returned to Dr. Douville for treatment of a leg injury. 
(R. 448) She continued to see Dr. Douville in July 1997 regarding the pain and bruising 
on her leg. (R. 448-49) The notes from her visit to Dr. Douville in June and on July 2, 
1997 do not refer to her depression. (R. 448-51) However, on July 7, 1997, when she 
returned for follow up on her leg, Dr. Douville provided "another note for work regarding 
her inability to work at night due to anxiety and depression." (R. 452) There are no 
further entries regarding her depression on that date nor after in Dr. Douville's records. 
(R. 605) Burgener continued to see her physician for unrelated physical problems 
including continued treatment of her leg and treatment of her asthma. Ms. Susan 
Sanderson, N.P., reported on July 16, 1997, when Burgener complained of asthma, that 
Burgener is "an alert female who does not appear to be in any distress." (R. 449) 
On August 29, 1997, Dr. Castleton observed that Burgener was under her care for 
depression and that Dr. Douville had recently increased Burgener's "medications in an 
attempt to stabilize her current condition." (R. 605) The records show further visits to 
Dr. Douville in December 1997 with no reference to depression or any limitations 
resulting from her depression. (R. 459-61) 
In fact, "after her visit with Dr. Castleton on August 29, 1997, Burgener's medical 
records contained no further notation of any medical treatment for her depression other 
than continued prescription writing for Prozac up through July 1998." (R. 606) 
According to Burgener's own testimony the most disabling period of her depression 
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lasted for about six weeks after her mother died. (R. 606) "Burgener acknowledged that 
once Dr. Douville prescribed Prozac, she started to recover her ability to concentrate and 
focus. Burgener agreed that she successfully managed her depression with Prozac." (R. 
606) 
Burgener further testified that in July of 1997 "her inability to work nights 
constituted the only significant impediment to her return to work as a medical laboratory 
technician at LabCorp." (R. 606) By August 1997, Burgener was sleeping with some 
regularity at night and was beginning to do other activities, such as play cards and take 
short walks. (R. 1013 at pp. 25-26.) 
In June 1997, LabCorp corporate management decided to downsize various 
departments at the facility at which Burgener worked. (R. 606) After an extensive 
review of all positions, a total of 13 positions were eliminated between July and 
September 1997. (R. 8) Burgener's position was one authorized by management to be 
eliminated. (R. 8) LabCorp does not eliminate a position when an employee is 
participating in the Company's Short Term Disability Plan. (R. 9) Upon the employee's 
release to return to work, the employee's position is then eliminated in accordance with 
the Company's severance policy. (R. 9) 
On September 1, 1997, LabCorp posted an opening for a Medical Technologist 
position that required a four-year degree. (R. 606) Burgener submitted an application for 
the position. (R. 606) However, Burgener had only a two-year degree, which Burgener 
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admitted was not sufficient for the job posting. (R. 606) On September 18, 1997, 
Burgener met with Human Resource personnel at LabCorp to discuss employment and 
again requested a day shift. (R. 606) She was informed that there were no openings for 
the day shift at the same rate of pay and for which she qualified. (R. 606) Burgener was 
given the options of taking a day shift position at lesser pay or accepting a severance 
package for her position that had been eliminated. (R. 9) On September 24, 1997, 
Burgener informed LabCorp that she would take a severance package because she would 
not accept a day position at a lesser pay rate. (R. 606) Burgener signed an 
acknowledgement regarding her acceptance of severance pay and received her severance 
check on September 25, 1997. (R. 606, 952) 
On December 28, 1997, Burgener was hired by ARUP Laboratories. (R. 607) 
Burgener started at ARUP working the 2:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. shift. (R. 607) She 
testified that she did not have any trouble working this shift at ARUP. (R. 1013 at p. 36.) 
"By her own admission, working at night constituted the only limitation that Ms. 
Burgener continued to suffer after the first six weeks of the onset of her depression. Yet, 
as of December 28, 1997 Ms. Burgener began employment with ARUP on a swing shift 
from 2:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. that had her working in part at night. Ms. Burgener 
provided no evidence that after she commenced employment with ARUP she continued 
under any restrictions against nighttime employment." (R. 607) 
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On July 7, 1998, Burgener visited Dr. Christopher Jones at a sleep disorder clinic, 
complaining that she had difficulty initiating sleep. (R. 607) Dr. Jones found that her 
sleep disorder was probably a combination of factors including constitutional sleep delay 
and restless legs symptoms. (R. 607) Dr. Jones did not tie Burgener's sleep problems to 
her prior depression, nor did he describe the duration or severity of the sleep problems. 
(R. 607) Burgener's medical records contain no further treatment or follow-up to this 
visit to Dr. Jones. (R. 607) 
On September 23, 1997, Burgener filed with the Utah Antidiscrimination and 
Labor Division a charge of discrimination against LabCorp claiming that it had failed to 
provide her with a reasonable accommodation for her disability. (R. 1-2) LabCorp 
answered Burgener's charge by denying that she was disabled within the meaning of 
Utah Code § 34A-5-106, and showing that it had eliminated Burgener's position pursuant 
to a general reduction in force. (R. 6-37) On April 17, 2000, the UALD issued an Order 
and Determination in favor of Burgener. (R. 76-86) On May 5, 2000, LabCorp sought 
an evidentiary hearing by filing a notice of appeal and request for a formal evidentiary 
hearing. (R. 87) After a pre-trial conference held by Administrative Law Judge Richard 
M. La Jeunesse on August 15, 2000, the parties engaged in discovery, including taking 
the deposition of Burgener. (R. 93-117, 1013) At some point during discovery, attorney 
John L. Black entered an appearance as counsel for Burgener. (R. 118) 
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On August 7-8, 2002, Judge La Jeunesse held a full evidentiary hearing on 
Burgener's claim. (R. 603) At the hearing Burgener was represented by Mr. Black. (R. 
603) Mr. Black introduced into evidence around 170 pages of material at the hearing to 
support Burgener's claim. (R. 352-522, 603) LabCorp introduced around 73 pages of 
material into evidence. (R.523-96, 603). On April 25, 2003 Judge La Jeunesse issued an 
order dismissing Burgener's claim on the grounds that she "factually and legally failed to 
qualify as disabled." (R. 603-12) 
On May 25, 2003, Ms. Kandi Steele, as a "para-legal representative and roommate 
having direct knowledge," filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission 
on behalf of Burgener. (R. 613-31) Ms. Steele failed to serve a copy of the Motion for 
Review on LabCorp, thus depriving LabCorp of a chance to respond to Burgener's 
renewed arguments. (R. 887) On May 28, 2003, Burgener filed a "Representation 
Notice" with the Labor Commission stating that she "was not satisfied with the 
representation of John Black Jr." and "no longer wish[ed] to have Mr. Black represent" 
her. (R. 631) She further stated that she wanted Ms. Steele to represent her in all 
concerns in this case. (R. 631) 
On August 30, 2002, the Utah Labor Commission upheld Judge La Jeunesse's 
decision. (R. 846-48) On September 20, 2002, Ms. Steele, on behalf of Burgener, filed a 
request for reconsideration with the Utah Labor Commission. (R. 849-75) On October 
31, 2002, the Utah Labor Commission again upheld Judge La Jeunesse's decision. (R. 
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1007-010) On December 2, 2002, Ms. Steele, on behalf of Burgener, filed a petition for 
review with this court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the Utah Labor Commission's decision affirming Judge 
La Jeunesse's order denying Bergener's petition. There are at least three reasons 
supporting affirmance here: 
First, the Labor Commission's findings of fact have not been properly challenged 
and are supported by substantial evidence. The factual underpinning of the Labor 
Commission's decision that Burgener failed to qualify as disabled was that her alleged 
disability was neither permanent nor long term. Burgener failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting this finding. Indeed, a review of the whole record shows that the Labor 
Commission's finding is supported by "substantial evidence": There is no medical 
evidence that Burgener suffered from depression more than five months after she was 
diagnosed, and Burgener admitted that she managed her depression with medication. 
Second, Burgener was not disabled, because her alleged impairment of depression 
did not substantially limit one or more of her major life activities. According to 
Burgener's own testimony, her depression only affected her major life activities for a 
short time. The only activity that she now alleges was affected for a longer period of 
time was her inability to work at night, which is not a major life activity and according to 
the record was neither permanent nor long term. Burgener's major life activity of 
working was not substantially limited merely because she allegedly could not work at 
night. Furthermore, she could work at night. Burgener returned to working a night shift 
within seven months of when she was diagnosed with depression. Finally, Burgener was 
not disabled because the record evidence is undisputed that her alleged impairment of 
depression was a short term condition. 
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Finally, Burgener's argument that she was "regarded" as disabled was not properly 
preserved for appeal and fails on the merits. Because this argument was not raised before 
the Labor Commission, it cannot be raised now, for the first time on appeal. But even if 
it were to be considered, this claim would fail because Burgener has not met her burden 
that LabCorp regarded Burgener as "substantially limited" in a major life activity. 
ARGUMENT 
In order to be successful on this Appeal, Burgener not only must show that the 
Labor Commission's legal determination is incorrect, but she likewise faces the heavy 
burden of showing this Court that the Labor Commission's factual determination is 
incorrect. Burgener, however, does not present any new factual or legal evidence that 
was not available or already considered by the Labor Commission. 
A. The Labor Commission's Findings Of Fact Have Not Been Properly 
Challenged And Are Supported By Substantial Evidence. 
This Court reviews the Utah Labor Commission's determination of claims under 
the Utah Antidiscrimination Act for correctness. See Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor 
Comm'n, 38 P.3d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). However, because Burgener is 
challenging the factual determinations made by the Labor Commission supporting the 
determination that Burgener was not disabled, Burgener "must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light 
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence." Id. (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989)). This Court reviews the Labor Commission's findings "in light of the 
whole record." Id (citing Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 
11 
1998)). Burgener failed to marshal the evidence that the Labor Commission's findings 
that she was only temporarily disabled was not supported by substantial evidence. 
1. Burgener has failed to marshal the evidence. 
The factual underpinning of the Labor Commission's finding that Burgener failed 
to qualify as disabled under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-106 was that her alleged 
impairment of depression was "neither permanent nor long term." (R. 607-10, 846). 
Burgener's sole argument against this finding is that she "continues to suffer from Major 
Depression" and her mediation does not "cure or correct the Major Depression." 
Appellant Br. at pp. 21-23. The length of Burgener's alleged depression and its impact 
on her major life activities is a question of fact. 
While Burgener is now pro se, at the time of the evidentiary hearing before Judge 
La Jeunesse she was represented by counsel, who is deemed competent. At the two day 
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Black introduced into evidence around 170 pages of material. 
(R. 352-522, 603) None of the evidence presented by Burgener shows that her 
depression was anything more than a short term condition. Indeed, Burgener's own 
testimony was that through medication she controlled her depression after the first six 
weeks following the death of her mother. (R. 606) 
By ignoring the Labor Commission and administrative judge's findings of fact and 
failing to provide any support to its position by conflicting or contradictory evidence, 
Burgener has failed to discharge her burden of marshaling the evidence. Grace Drilling 
Co., 776 P.2d at 68 (the party challenging the findings of fact "must marshal all of the 
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evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light 
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence"). Because Burgener has failed to discharge her burden of marshalling the 
evidence, this Court should accept the Labor Commission's findings as conclusive, and 
affirm. See Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d447, 450-51 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. The Labor Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
In addition to failing to properly marshal the evidence, Bergener has failed to 
show that the Labor Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
"'Substantial evidence' is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate 
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Viktron/Lika Utah, 38 P.3d at 
997. The Labor Commission's finding that Burgener's alleged impairment of depression 
was "neither permanent nor long term" is well documented in the record. Judge La 
Jeunesse found that, "after [Burgener's] visit with Dr. Castleton on August 29, 1997, Ms. 
Burgener's medical records contained no further notation of any medical treatment for 
her depression other than continued prescription writing for Prozac up through July 
1998." (R. 606) Burgener does not and cannot point to any other evidence of medical 
treatment for depression. Furthermore, according to Burgener's own testimony the most 
disabling period of her depression lasted for about six weeks after her mother died. (R. 
606) "Ms. Burgener acknowledged that once Dr. Douville prescribed Prozac, she started 
to recover her ability to concentrate and focus. Ms. Burgener agreed that she successfully 
managed her depression with Prozac." (R. 606) This is more than enough evidence "to 
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convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Viktron/Lika Utah, 38 P.3d at 997. 
Thus, this Court should affirm the Labor Commission's decision. 
B, Burgener Is Not Disabled Under the ADA Because Her Depression Did Not 
Substantially Limit A Major Life Activity. 
The term "disability" is defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 
as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1995).3 The guidelines promulgated 
to interpret the ADA state that in determining whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a "major life activity," a court must look at (i) the nature and severity of the 
impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the 
permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact resulting 
from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (emphasis added). If an impairment 
affects - but does not substantially limit - a major life activity, an individual is not 
disabled. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) ("The term 
'substantially limits' means among other things, '[u]nable to perform a major life activity 
that the average person in the general population can perform.5" (citation omitted)). 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that if a physical impairment "is 
corrected by mitigating measures . . . it does not 'substantially limit' a major life 
activity." Id at 483. 
For purposes of this appeal, LabCorp agrees it is possible that depression may be 
an impairment as defined by the ADA. The ultimate question in this case is whether 
Burgener's impairment - her depression - substantially limited a major life activity. As 
found by the Labor Commission, the evidence is that Burgener's alleged impairment of 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-102(5) defines disability as "[a] physical or mental disability 
as defined and covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act." 
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depression does not substantially limit any major life activity. Thus, the Labor 
Commission correctly found that Burgener was not disabled. 
1. Burgener has not met her burden of demonstrating that her 
depression substantially limited her from a major life activity. 
Burgener 's depression did not substantially limit any major life activity. Courts 
do not assume that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Rather, the 
claimant must present evidence as to how her impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity by reference to the general population. Burgener has not and cannot satisfy her 
burden. 
Judge La Jeunesse found, which LabCorp accepts for the purposes of this appeal 
only, that Burgener's depression initially affected her major life activities of "(1) sleep, 
(2) self care, (3) parenting, and (4) management of her household." (R. 610) While 
Burgener now maintains that she still suffers from depression, she admitted before Judge 
Le Jeunesse, and does not now dispute, that through the medication of Prozac she was 
able to overcome the limitations her depression caused in these major life activities. (R. 
606-07) As a matter of law, these major life activities were not "substantially limited," 
because any limitation was very short term. See also Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 
534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) ("The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long-
term."). Burgener admitted that "working at night constituted the only limitation that Ms. 
Burgener continued to suffer after the first six weeks of the onset of her depression." (R. 
607) As discussed in detail below, working nights, however, is not a major life activity. 
Burgener did present some limited evidence that she suffered from sleep problems 
as late as July 7, 1998. (R. 607) Burgener did not and cannot connect this to her alleged 
disability of depression. The treating doctor reported that her sleep disorder was a 
combination of factors including constitutional sleep delay and restless leg symptoms. 
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(R. 607). This doctor did not tie Burgener's sleep problems to her prior depression, nor 
did he describe the duration or severity of the sleep problems. Burgener's medical 
records contain no further treatment or follow-up regarding her sleep problems. (R. 607) 
In a similar case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiffs claim that her 
depression affected her major life activity of sleeping, despite the fact that it occurred 
over a two year period, and plaintiff failed to show it was "severe, long term, or had a 
permanent impact." See Pack v. Kmart Corp.. 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 811(1999). 
Burgener mistakenly appears to believe that just because she argues that her 
depression was long-term, which it was not, that it also "substantially limited" her major 
life activities. Burgener never pointed to any major life activity that was substantially 
limited. Even if Burgener's unsupported allegations that she is still suffering from 
depression were true, her claim would still fail because this alleged depression did not 
"substantially limit" any of her major life activities. As noted by the Supreme Court, a 
substantial impairment is "an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual 
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Velarde 
v. Associated Regional and University Pathologists. 61 Fed. Appx. 627, 630 (10th Cir. 
2003) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198).4 In Velarde, the Tenth Circuit 
rejected appellant's arguments of "how his impairment prevent him from performing the 
specific duties of his assigned job" and found it dispositive that appellant did not show 
how his impairment "substantially limit his overall daily functioning." Id. at 631. 
Similarly, in this case Burgener only points to how her alleged depression prevents her 
from working a specific shift and she has utterly failed to show how this alleged 
4
 A copy of this opinion is annexed hereto as Exhibit B in the Addendum. 
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impairment limits her daily functioning. Thus, this Court should uphold the Labor 
Commission's decision for this reason alone. 
2. Burgener's inability to work at night was not a major life 
activity nor was it permanent or long-term. 
The Labor Commission did not find, and Burgener does not appear to argue, that 
her depression affected her major life activity of working. (R. 608-10, 856; Appellate 
Brief at p. 23). Indeed, Burgener admits that she has been working for over the last five 
and half years. (R. 607; Appellate Brief at p. 23.) The only thing that she contends is 
that depression affected her ability to work at night. (R. 607; Appellate Brief at p. 22). 
Even if she is claiming that her depression interfered with her ability to work the night 
shift, as a matter of law the inability to work nights does not substantially interfere with 
the ability to work. See Williams v. City of Charlotte, 899 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.N.C. 
1995) (holding that plaintiffs inability to work the night shift was insufficient to 
establish significant barrier to obtaining employment). Courts require a claimant to 
demonstrate a significant restriction in the ability to perform "either a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having 
comparable training, skills and abilities." Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th 
Cir. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1152 (1995). "When the major life activity under 
consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a 
minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs." Sutton, 
527 U.S. at 491. "Evidence of disqualification from a single position or narrow range of 
jobs will not support a finding that an individual is substantially limited from the major 
life activity of working." Sherrod v. American Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 
1998) (citations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I). 
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Furthermore, even if working at night is a major life activity, Judge La Jeunesse 
found that "Ms. Burgener's restriction from working at night lasted no later than 
December 28, 1997." (R. 610) On that date, Burgener was hired by ARUP Laboratories. 
(R. 607) Burgener started at ARUP working the 2:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. shift. (R. 607) 
She testified that she did not have any trouble working this shift at ARUP. (R. 1013 at p. 
36.) "Ms. Burgener provided no evidence that after she commenced employment with 
ARUP she continued under any restrictions against nighttime employment." (R. 607) 
Thus, even if an inability to work the night shift was considered a substantial impairment 
on a major life activity, which it is not, Burgener's "limitation on working nights 
qualified as neither permanent nor long term under the evidence produced in this case." 
(R. 610) See also Toyota Motor Mfg., 122 S. Ct. at 690 ("The impairment's impact must 
also be permanent or long-term."). Thus, this Court should affirm. 
3. Burgener's depression was a short term condition and thus was 
not "substantially limiting." 
Finally, short-term conditions are generally not considered "substantially limiting" 
and thus are not covered under the ADA or the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. See 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). While Burgener alleges that she still suffers from depression, she has 
not produced any evidence to support this assertion, nor to link her alleged current 
depression to the depression that allegedly occurred while she was at LabCorp. 
Furthermore, she has not produced any evidence to contradict her own statements and the 
record that her alleged depression was controlled by Prozac. The undisputed evidence is 
that "after her visit with Dr. Castleton on August 29, 1997, Ms. Burgener's medical 
records contained no further notation of any medical treatment for her depression other 
than continued prescription writing for Prozac up through July 1998." (R. 606) Burgener 
IS 
has failed to produce any evidence to contradict the findings of the Labor Commission 
that her depression was short term. 
Case law supports the proposition that short term conditions do not qualify as 
disabilities. For example, in Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 
1996), cert, denied, 117 S.Ct. 1247 (1997), the court held that a psychological 
impairment that lasted for approximately three and one-half months was only 
"temporary" and "was not of sufficient duration to fall within the protections of the ADA 
as a disability." Similarly, in Holmes v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13787 (E.D. Pa. 1998),5 the plaintiff suffered from "acute stress related anxiety." 
Id at *2. She self-diagnosed her stress, anxiety and depression in March, 1996 and 
received medical documentation two months later. By June, 1996, however, she stated 
on her application for unemployment that she was able to fully resume work and did so, 
part-time, in September, 1996. There was also no evidence of any preexisting 
depression. Id at * 12. Accordingly, the court found that "[t]his evidence tends to show 
that plaintiff cannot be considered disabled as her stress and anxiety was [sic] of a 
transitory and episodic nature. Any work impairment plaintiff may have suffered was 
merely temporary; to be protected by the ADA, a plaintiffs disability must be a 
permanent or long-term limitation." Id See also Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 
F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiffs 3 1/2 month impairment was not covered under the 
ADA "because this court has found a temporary impairment of seven months, by itself, 
'too short in duration'") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Huckans v. U.S. Postal 
Service, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30755 (10th Cir. 1999) (condition lasting only three 
5
 A copy of this opinion is annexed hereto as Exhibit C in the Addendum. 
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months would not be a disability) (citing Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 
F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999) (Same; seven months)).6 
Much like the plaintiff in Pizza Hut, Burgener's depression was brought about by 
a significant occurrence in her life - the death of her mother. A couple of weeks later, by 
April 7, 1997, she was placed on Prozac, which helped her "recover her ability to 
concentrate and focus." (R. 606) The last medical report regarding Burgener's 
depression was in August 1997. (R. 606) In fact, at the hearing before Judge La 
Jeunesse, "Ms. Burgener agreed that she successfully managed her depression with 
Prozac." (R. 606) Based on Burgener's own testimony, that medication controlled her 
depression, and on the fact that Burgener provided no substantive evidence that her 
depression was anything more than a short term condition, the Labor Commission 
appropriately held that her impairment was at most a five month problem and, as in Pizza 
Hut, was "merely temporary" and not protected by the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. 
Recognizing that she is bound by her testimony that she has successfully managed 
her depression with medication, Burgener now appears to argue that the medication only 
"reduces the symptoms," but does "cure" her depression as she is still unable to work the 
night shift. See Appellate Brief at p. 21-23, 29B. This argument misses the point. As 
discussed above, working the night shift is not a major life activity, thus even if 
Burgener's alleged depression did still exist and did not allow her to work the night shift, 
she would not be disabled. But more fundamentally, Burgener's argument is incorrect 
because her medication does not have to "cure" her from depression, but as recognized 
by the Supreme Court "the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be 
made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's impairment." Sutton, 527 
U.S. at 458. The record confirms that Burgener controlled her depression with 
6
 A copy of this opinion is annexed hereto as Exhibit D in the Addendum. 
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medication. (R. 606) Indeed, Burgener offers absolutely no record evidence (1) to 
contradict her own testimony that her medication controlled her depression, (2) to support 
her assertion that she still suffers from depression, (3) to support that she is limited in any 
major life activity; or (4) that she has not been able to work nights for many years now. 
C. Burgener's Argument That She Was Regarded As Disabled Was Not 
Properly Preserved For Appeal And Fails On The Merits 
Apparently recognizing that she is not disabled, for the first time in this case 
Burgener raises the argument that even if she is not disabled, she was "regarded as 
disabled" by LabCorp. Appellant's Brief at p. 18-19. This Court should reject this 
argument because it was never presented below. Even if it were preserved, however, this 
claim would fail because Burgener has not met her burden that LabCorp regarded 
Burgener as "substantially limited" in a major life activity. 
1. Burgener did not raise the issues that she was regarded as disabled 
before the Labor Commission. 
The Utah Supreme Court has "consistently held that issues not raised in 
proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in 
exceptional circumstances." Brown & Root Ind. Serv. and Highland Ins. v. Industrial 
Common of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).7 The Utah Supreme 
Court in Brown & Root found this rule to be "basic and necessary to orderly procedure." 
Id. 
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Section 63-46b-14(2) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides that "[a] 
party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available 
. . . ." Consistent with the Administrative Procedure's Act's limitation on judicial review, 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant's brief to include a "citation 
to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5)(A). Despite this requirement, Burgener's brief contains absolutely no citation to 
the record demonstrating that the issue of whether LabCorp "regarded" Burgener as 
disabled was raised in the proceedings before the Labor Commission. Although this 
Court will allow pro se litigants some leeway, LabCorp can find no indication in the 
record that this argument was ever raised below. It is important to note that during the 
two day evidentiary hearing held by Judge La Jeunesse that Burgener was represented by 
counsel and had the opportunity to raise such an argument at that time. Furthermore, 
Burgener filed both a motion for review and a motion for reconsideration with the Labor 
Commission and failed to raise the argument in either proceeding. (R. 613-31, 849-75) 
In sum, because Burgener did not exhaust her administrative remedies and raise 
the argument that she was "regarded" as being disabled before the Labor Commission, 
Burgener's newly conceived argument is precluded from appellate review and this Court 
should reject it.. See Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677. 
7
 No exceptional circumstances exit in this case. Burgener was aptly represented by 
council in the two day evidentiary hearing and has had two additional opportunities to 
raise this issue before the Labor Commission. 
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2. Burgener's argument that she was regarded as disabled fails on the 
merits. 
Even if Burgener had properly preserved this issue for appellate review, which she 
did not, Burgener's argument would still fail on the merits. As discussed by the Supreme 
Court in detail in Sutton, Burgener has the burden of showing that LabCorp believes 
"either (1) that [Burgener] has a substantially limiting impairment that [she] does not 
have or (2) that [she] has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the 
impairment is not so limiting." Id. 527 U.S. at 466-67. Burgener's brief is devoid of any 
argument of which of these two theories she is now asserting. Burgener's brief is also 
devoid of any citation to the record to support either of these theories. 
Regardless of which theory she is now asserting, as found by the Supreme Court 
in Sutton, Burgener's claim that she was regarded as disabled by LabCorp must fail 
because she has not stated a claim that LabCorp regarded her impairment as 
"substantially limiting [her] ability to work" or any other major life activity. IdL 527 U.S. 
at 467-68. Even when dealing with the "regarded as" disabled theory of liability, "the 
statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they 
are unable to work in a broad class of jobs." Id., 527 U.S. at 468. Burgener appears only 
to allege that LabCorp regarded her as disabled because she could not work the night 
shift—this simply is not enough to show that LabCorp believed that Burgener was 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See id. at 469 ("Because the 
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position of global airline pilot is a single job, this allegation does not support the claim 
that respondent regards petitioners as having a substantially limiting impairment."). 
Finally, Burgener's reliance on Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 
1996), is misplaced. The Ninth Circuit's decision reversed a summary judgment in favor 
of a defendant on the grounds that there was a material issue of fact of whether the 
plaintiff was regarded as disabled. See Holihan, 87 F.3d at 366. In this case, Judge La 
Jeunesse held an evidentiary hearing and although there is no record that this issue was 
ever presented, Judge La Jeunesse appropriately considered all Burgener's evidence as 
the trier of fact. (R. 603-612). Despite Burgener's assertions, Holihan does not support 
her factual claim that she was regarded as disabled. Indeed, Burgener does not and 
cannot point to any record evidence that LabCorp regarded her as "substantially limited" 
in any major life activity. To the extent this Court decides to address this argument on 
the merits, it should be rejected on it face. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the Labor Commission's 
decision finding that Burgener was not a disabled person under the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act. LabCorp respectfully submits that the Labor Commission's 
findings of fact have not been contradicted and should be accepted by this Court. Given 
those facts, Burgener's claim that she was disabled or "regarded" as disabled should fail. 
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Respectfully submitted this 25th day of August, 2003. 
Mark 0. Morris 
James D. Gardner 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Laboratory Corporation of America 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
Case No. 8970722 
ROBIN F. BURGENER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF 
AMERICA (LABCORP), 
Respondents, 
HEARING: Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on August 7-8, 2001. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of 
the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Robin Burgener, was present and represented by attorney 
John Black. 
The respondents were represented by attorney Julie Thomas. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 23, 1997 Robin Burgener filed with the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor 
Division (UALD) a charge of discrimination against Laboratories Corporation of America 
(LabCorp). Ms. Burgener alleged that LabCorp violated Utah Code §34A-5-106 when it 
terminated her employment as a Medical Laboratory Technician. Ms. Burgener claimed that 
LabCorp refused to provide her a reasonable accommodation for her disability. 
On November 5, 1997 LabCorp filed an answer to Ms. Burgener's charge of discrimination. 
LabCorp denied that Ms. Burgener was disabled within the meaning of Utah Code §34A-5-106. 
LabCorp also claimed that it eliminated Ms. Burgener's position pursuant to a general reduction 
in force. 
* FINDINGS OF FACT, 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
* ORDER 
* 
* 
* Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
* 
* 
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II. ISSUES. 
Did LabCorp violate Utah Code §34A-5-106 when it terminated Robin Burgener's employment 
as a Medical Laboratory Technician? 
III. PROCEEDINGS. 
On April 17, 2000 UALD issued a Determination and Order. On May 5, 2000 LabCorp filed a 
Notice of Appeal and Request for Formal Evidentiary Hearing with respect to UALD's 
Determination and Order. On March 23, 2001 LabCorp filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On May 5, 2001 I Issued an Order denying LabCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
August 7-8, 2001 I held an evidentiary hearing in this Case. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Robin Burgener began her employment with LabCorp as a medical laboratory technician on 
August 26, 1991. Ms. Burgener worked in the Hematology Department at LabCorp. During her 
employment with LabCorp, Ms. Burgener generally worked the "graveyard shift" from 8:30 p.m. 
to 5:00 a.m. 
Subsequent to her mother's death on March 24, 1997, Ms. Burgener took bereavement leave for 
three days between March 24, 1997, and March 27, 1997. Ms. Burgener attempted to return to 
work on March 28, 1997, but could only complete two hours. Ms. Burgener testified that when 
she returned to work she had a hard time with judgment and organizing her work. Ms. Burgener 
also stated that she suffered a "panic attack." 
On April 3, 1997 Dr. Douglas Douville, Ms. Burgener's treating physician, stated that: 
Since her mother's death, she has had a very significant grief reaction with all of 
the classic signs of depression. {Exhibit "P-ll"]. 
Dr. Douville observed that Ms. Burgener had problems sleeping and prescribed Valium, [id.]. 
On April 7, 1997 Dr. Douville recorded: 
The depression persists and is very problematic as she cannot concentrate. 
ASSESSMENT: Grief reaction which is looking more like a major depression. 
[id.]. 
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On April 7, 1997 Dr. Douville began Ms. Burgener on Prozac, [id.]. On April 18, 1997 Dr. 
Douville provided a work release for Ms. Burgener that stated: 
Robin's anxiety and depression continues to make her unable to 
work....Recommend she be moved to day time work when she returns, [id.]. 
On April 18, 1997 Ms. Burgener received notice of her approval for "Short Term Disability" 
benefits effective March 24, 1997. [Exhibit P-13"]. Ms. Burgener's "Short Term Disability" 
benefits continued through September 23, 1997. [id.]. 
On April 28, 1997 Dr. Douville provided a second work release and observed: "Robin continues 
to suffer from depression and is unable to return to evening/night shift work." [Exhibit "P-l 1"]. 
On May 2, 1997 Ms. Burgener saw Dr. Donna Castleton DSW LCSW BCD for counseling. 
[Exhibit "P-10"]. Dr. Castleton noted that Ms. Burgener "could not concentrate" and was 
"forgetful." [id.]. Dr. Castleton diagnosed Ms. Burgener with: 
Axis I Bereavement, Adjustment Disorder, Anxiety, and Depression. 
Axis III Mental and physical fatigue 
Axis IV Severe, [id.]. 
On May 15, 1997 Dr. Douville opined: "Robin continues to be unable to work night/PMs shifts 
due to severe depression." [Exhibit "P-l 1"]. On July 3, 1997 Dr. Castleton addressed a note to 
Vicki Romero, the Human Resource Manager for LabCorp. [Exhibit "P-10"]. Dr. Castleton 
stated that: 
Robin Burgener has been a patient of mine since May 2, 1997 for major 
depression following her mother's death. She is medically unable to work 
evenings or nights, [id.]. 
On August 29, 1997 Dr. Castleton observed that: 
Robin Burgener has been under my care for the treatment of depression and panic 
disorder. I am coordinating treatment with her family physician who is 
monitoring her medication. He recently increased Robin's anti-depressant 
medications in an attempt to stabilize her current condition. Given Robin's 
current psychiatric state, I am exploring more intensive treatment alternatives 
which may include day treatment and/or possibly an inpatient stay. [id.]. 
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At the hearing Ms. Burgener testified concerning her condition during the worst part of her 
depression shortly after the death of her mother. Ms Burgener recounted that her depression 
affected her in a manner she equated to "living underwater." Ms. Burgener stated that nothing 
came into focus for her. Ms. Burgener said she got out of bed late or not at all. Ms. Burgener 
explained that she lacked the ability to parent her daughter including the provision of discipline 
or help with homework. According to Ms. Burgener, she went days without bathing or 
grooming. Ms. Burgener averred that she performed no housework. Ms. Burgener said lost the 
ability to handle her finances. Ms. Burgener claimed that because her mind drifted, she gave up 
watching television or reading books. Ms. Burgener described how she got lost on walks or 
driving in her neighborhood. Finally, Ms. Burgener alleged that she experienced trouble 
sleeping. 
Ms. Burgener acknowledged that the most disabling period of her depression lasted for about six 
weeks after her mother died. Ms. Burgener acknowledged that once Dr. Douville prescribed 
Prozac, she started to recover her ability to concentrate and focus. Ms. Burgener agreed that she 
successfully managed her depression with Prozac. In fact after her visit with Dr. Castleton on 
August 29, 1997, Ms. Burgener's medical records contained no further notations of any medical 
treatment for her depression other than continued prescription writing for Prozac up through July 
1998. [Exhibit "P-12"]. 
Ms. Burgener testified that in July of 1997 her inability to work nights constituted the only 
significant impediment to her return to work as a medical laboratory technician at LabCorp. Ms. 
Burgener claimed that toward the end of July or early August 1997 she learned of an opening 
during the day-shift in the Hematology Department at LabCorp. Ms. Burgener alleged that she 
filled out an application for the day job in Hematology and submitted it to Vicki Romero, the 
Human Resources manager at LabCorp. Vicki Romero told Ms. Burgener that she lacked the 
necessary qualifications for the job because the position required a four year degree. Ms. 
Burgener admitted that the day position she sought was for a medical technologist which 
normally required a four year degree. [Exhibit "R-2"]. 
Ms. Burgener maintained that LabCorp should have allowed her to fill or underfill the vacant 
medical technologist position during the day-shift as a reasonable accommodation to her 
disability. Ms. Burgener asserted that Tina Kirkman, another medical laboratory technician, in 
fact underfilled the medical technologist position sought by Ms. Burgener. 
Ms. Burgener testified that on September 18, 1997 Vicki Romero told her LabCorp eliminated 
Ms. Burgener's job during a period of corporate downsizing. Ms. Burgener confirmed her 
awareness of a downsizing commenced by LabCorp in June of 1997. On September 24, 1997 
Ms. Burgener accepted a severance package from LabCorp rather than an offer of several lesser 
paying jobs offered to her. 
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On December 28, 1997 Ms. Burgener obtained another job at ARUP Laboratories (ARUP). Ms. 
Burgener started at ARUP working the 2:00 p.m. to 12:30 am. Shift. Eventually Ms. Burgener's 
job at ARUP allowed her to work during the day from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Ms. Burgener still 
worked for ARUP at the time of the hearing. 
On July 7, 1998 Ms. Burgener went to Dr. Christopher Jones M.D. at the Sleep Disorder Clinic 
for some problems she had sleeping. [Exhibit "P-12"]. Dr. Jones stated: 
In summary...probably has a combination of three or four factors disrupting her 
sleep. First of all, she has a constitutional sleep delay tendency and is only getting 
about six hours of sleep per night. As a result of late sleep onset time, this may 
not be adequate sleep time for her...Secondly, she may have restless legs 
symptoms associated with iron deficiency... [id.]. 
Ms. Burgener's medical records contained no further mention of treatment nor any follow-up to 
her visit at the Sleep Disorder Clinic. Dr. Jones never tied Ms. Burgener's sleep problems to her 
prior depression treated by Dr. Douville and Dr. Castleton one year earlier. Further, Dr. Jones 
never described the duration nor severity of the sleep problems. Dr, Jones only speculated that 
six hours sleep per night "may not be adequate sleep time for her." [id.]. 
The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that after the death of her mother on 
March 24, 1997 Ms. Burgener suffered a bout of severe depression, anxiety, and bereavement. 
The undisputed facts in this case confirmed that for six weeks the impairment caused by Ms. 
Burgener's depression and anxiety limited her major life activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) 
parenting, and;(4) management of her household. However, after the first six weeks following 
the death of her njiother, the preponderance of the evidence in this case demonstrated that Ms. 
Burgener successfully managed her depression with Prozac. 
By her own admission, working at night constituted the only limitation that Ms. Burgener 
continued to suffer after the first six weeks of the onset of her depression. Yet, as of December 
28, 1997 Ms. Burgener began employment with ARUP on a swing shift from 2:00 p.m to 12:30 
a.m. that had her working in part at night. Ms. Burgener provided no evidence that after she 
commenced employment with ARUP she continued under any restrictions against nighttime 
employment. 
On July 7, 1998, Ms. Burgener sought help for some sleep disturbance. Nevertheless, the record 
in this case remained bereft of evidence that linked Ms. Burgener's sleep problems on July 7, 
1998 with some ongoing problem caused by her bout of depression and anxiety originally 
occasioned by her mother's death. Further, the record in this case contained little concerning the 
severity and duration of the sleep problems referenced on July 7, 1998. 
00807 
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In conclusion, most of the limitations on Ms. Burgener's major life activities caused by her 
depression and anxiety lasted a relatively short six weeks until successfully managed by 
medication. In any event, no evidence existed that any of Ms. Burgener's limitations on major 
life activities endured beyond December of 1997. The preponderance of the evidence in this case 
disclosed that Ms. Burgener factually failed to qualify as disabled under the provisions of Utah 
Code §34A-5-106 
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
After the death of her mother on March 24, 1997 Ms. Burgener suffered a bout of severe 
depression, anxiety, and bereavement. For six weeks the impairment caused by Ms. Burgener's 
depression and anxiety limited her major life activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) parenting, 
and; (4) management of her household. However, after the first six weeks following the death of 
her mother, Ms. Burgener successfully managed her depression with Prozac. Working at night 
constituted the only limitation that Ms. Burgener continued to suffer after the first six weeks of 
the onset of her depression. Yet, the limitation of Ms. Burgener working at night lasted no later 
than December of 1997. 
On July 7, 1998, Ms. Burgener sought help for some sleep disturbance. Nevertheless, the record 
in this case remained bereft of evidence that linked Ms. Burgener's sleep problems on July 7, 
1998 with some ongoing problem caused by her bout of depression and anxiety occasioned by 
her mother's death. Further, the record in this case contained little concerning the severity and 
duration of the sleep problems referenced on July 7, 1998. 
Utah Code § 34A-5-106(1) states in relevant part that: 
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
(a)(i) For an employer to refuse to hire, promote, or to discharge, demote, 
terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of 
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any 
persons otherwise qualified; because of ...disability. 
Utah Code § 34A-5-102(5) defines disability as: 
[a] physical or mental disability as defined and covered by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12102 (ADA). 
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The United States Supreme Court held that under the ADA: 
[a] disability is defined as: 
(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual: 
(B) A record of such impairment; or 
(C) Being regarded as having such impairment. § 12102(2). Sutton v. United 
Airlines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, _ , 144 L. Ed 2d 450, _ , 119 S. Ct. 2139, _ (1999). 
[see also: Utah Administrative Code R. 606-1-2.E.]. 
The Court in Sutton went on to hold that: 
The term "substantially limits" means among other things, "[u]nable to perform a 
major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform;" 
or "[significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which 
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform that same life activity." (Citation omitted). Finally, 
"[m]ajor [l]ife [activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working." (Citation omitted), id. 
The Court in Sutton concluded: 
[i]t is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a 
physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures-both positive and 
negative-must be taken into account when judging whether that person is 
'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act. 
To be sure, a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by 
mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it 
does not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity, id. 
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Ms. Burgener's initial onset of depression and anxiety in fact constituted an impairment that 
substantially limited her with respect to the major life activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) 
parenting, and; (4) management of her household. However, after the first six weeks following 
the death of her mother, Ms. Burgener successfully corrected and mitigated her depression with 
Prozac. Therefore, under the holding in Sutton, Ms. Burgener ultimately failed to qualify as 
disabled within the ADA and Utah Code § 34A-5-102(5). 
Ms. Burgener's restriction from working1 at night lasted no later than December 28, 1997. In 
Toyota Motor Mfg v. Williams the United States Supreme Court held that for an individual to be 
"substantially limited:" "The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term." In the 
present case Ms. Burgener's limitation on working nights qualified as neither permanent nor long 
term under the evidence produced in this case. 
Ms. Burgener provided some evidence of sleep problems as late as July 7, 1998. Ms. Burgener 
sought help for some sleep disturbance. Nevertheless, the record in this case remained bereft of 
evidence that linked Ms. Burgener's sleep problems on July 7, 1998 with some ongoing problem 
caused by her bout of depression and anxiety originally occasioned by her mother's death. 
Further, the record in this case contained little concerning the severity and duration of the sleep 
problems referenced on July 7, 1998. 
In the case of Pack v. KMART Corp. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the ADA 
claim of Terisita Pack who claimed her moderate to severe depression interfered with her major 
life functions of inter alia sleeping. Pack v. KMART Corp., 166 F. 3d 1300, (10th Cir. 1999).' 
The Tenth Circuit determined that "sleeping is a major life activity." kL However, the Tenth 
Circuit in Pack found that Ms. Pack's "episodes of sleep disruption" and "waking without feeling 
refreshed" over a two year period of time were not severe, long term, nor permanent in impact. 
id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "Pack failed to satisfy her burden to present evidence of 
her impairment and the extent to which the impairment limited her major activity of sleeping." 
14 
In the present case, the evidence presented concerning Ms. Burgener's sleep problems came short 
of that even presented by Ms. Pack. Accordingly, Ms. Burgener failed to provide sufficient 
evidence that her.sleep problems constituted a severe, long term impairment on her major life 
activity of sleeping. 
In conclusion, Ms. Burgener factually and legally failed to qualify as disabled under the 
provisions of Ut^h Code §34A-5-106. 
!The Court in Sutton concluded that a qualified disability under the ADA with respect the 
major life activity of working required an inability "to work a broad range of jobs. id. 
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IV. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Robin Burgener's claim of discrimination against respondent, 
Laboratories Corporation of America, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this 25th day of April 2001 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party, may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
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DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States District Court, District of Utah, granted summary 
judgment to defendant employer after plaintiff terminated employee sued the employer under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 5 12101 et seq. (ADA) and the trial court found that the 
terminated employee failed to submit evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
he was "disabled" under the ADA. The terminated employee appealed. 
OVERVIEW: An employer conducted laboratory testing of medical specimens. A terminated 
employee was a courier for the employer. According to the job description, a courier had to be able to 
maneuver boxes weighing up to 50 pounds. He was assigned to several routes on which he picked up 
specimens. While doing such work, he began experiencing back pain. He took off t ime from work and 
was treated. He returned to work two months later and was under a 25-pound lifting restriction. He 
then took a medical leave and soon returned, again under the same restriction. He soon suffered a 
non-work related injury. He and his doctors determined he could no return to work. The employer 
then terminated his employment. He alleged he had been discriminated against under the Americans 
With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. 5 12101 et seq. After the trial court granted summary 
judgment to the employer, the appellate court found that lifting was a major life activity. However, it 
also found that he did not show how the alleged disability imposed a substantial impairment on that 
activity since he did not show how his impairments, even in the aggregate, substantially limited his 
overall daily functioning. 
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed. 
CORE TERMS: impairment, lifting, pound, substantial impairment, comparative, claimant, disabled, lift, 
twenty-five, route, genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment, disability, return to work, diagnosis, 
specimens, airport, unable to perform, average person, functioning, aggregate, comparing, severely, per se 
rule, substantiality, demonstrating, occasionally, assigned, shoulder, courier 
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OPINIONBY: Michael W. McConnell 
DPINION: [ * 6 2 8 ] ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
. Footnotes 
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res 
ludicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; 
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
End Footnotes [**2] 
Plaintiff Roy Velarde filed a complaint against his former employer, Associated Regional and University 
Pathologists (ARUP), alleging discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, finding that Plaintiff failed to 
submit evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was "disabled" within the 
meaning of the ADA. H / v l ,?On appeal, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same legal standards as the district court. Baty v. Willamette Indust, Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 
1241 (10th Cir. 1999). We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. 
Defendant ARUP conducts laboratory testing of medical specimens received from medical providers. Velarde 
worked as a full time courier for ARUP. His duties included traveling to various locations and picking up 
specimens for testing. According to the job description, a courier must be "able to maneuver boxes 
weighing up to fifty pounds." Appellee's App. at 22-23. Velarde was assigned to several routes, including 
<+ J-»- W U l l l V l l l U Y V^/XtU.l.XV-'XX ~ \J X X V^VX. JC i - U L / A . VJZ* / rage ^01o 
ne [ * * 3 ] to the airport to pick up specimens arriving from out of state (the "airport route"), and one to 
le University of Utah health care facilities (the "University route"). According to Velarde, the airport route 
squired more driving and less lifting than the University route. 
1 October of 1994, Velarde began experiencing back pain. He took off t ime from work and received 
eatment at the University of Utah Spine Center. In late December of that year, Velarde returned to work 
nder a twenty-five pound lifting restriction. Velarde worked for a few weeks in early 1995 before again 
iking [ * 6 2 9 ] medical leave due to his back pain. On May 25, 1995, after several weeks of treatment 
i d diagnosis, Velarde's physician allowed him to return to work with a twenty-five pound lifting restriction, 
ith no repetitive lifting. Appellee's App. at 66. These restrictions were reaffirmed on June 12, 1995. 
ppellee's App. at 94. On June 17, 1995, Velarde suffered a non-work related injury, and Velarde, in 
)nsultation with his doctors, determined that he could not return to work. ARUP terminated Velarde's 
nployment on July 18, 1995. 
i Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615, 122 S. Ct. 681 
>002), [ * * 4 ] the Supreme Court held that H / V 27to qualify as "disabled" under the ADA, a claimant must 
smonstrate that his impairment imposes a "substantial" limitation on a "major life activity." The Court 
ifined substantial impairment as "an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from 
)ing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Id. at 198; see also Lusk v. 
/der Integrated Logistics. 238 F.3d 1237, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001). 
le parties are in agreement that Plaintiff is impaired, and that HN3 :?li f t ing is a major life activity. See Lowe 
Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 1996) (lifting is major life activity); Lusk, 238 
3d at 1240 (same). Thus, the relevant question is whether Plaintiff's impairment "substantially limits" the 
ajor life activity of lifting. 
reliance on H / V 47the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) regulations interpreting the 
)A, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( j ) ( l ) , n l this Court has held that to demonstrate that an impairment is 
ibstantially limiting a plaintiff must show that he is "unable to perform the [ * * 5 ] activity or is 
jjnificantly restricted in the ability to perform the major life activity compared to the general population." 
iskF 238 F.3d at 1240. Where an impairment is not so severe that it is "substantially limiting on its face," 
i ADA plaintiff must present "evidence comparing her . . . restrictions to that of an average person." Id. 
1 Limitations on the ability to engage in life activities, such as lifting heavy objects, is part of the human 
ndition, and unless an ADA plaintiff can show that his impairment reduces his capabilities significantly 
ilow those of the average person, he is not deemed "disabled" under the Act. 
. Footnotes 
In Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 194, H / V 57the Supreme Court declined to decide what level of deference, if 
iy, should be given to the EEOC's interpretation of the term "disability" as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 
)-(]'). This Court, however, has adopted the standard embodied in 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(i) as the rule for 
is Circuit. Lusk. 238 F.3d at 1240. 
I H / V 6 7 i t may be possible in certain cases for a plaintiff to meet this burden by presenting particularized 
idence regarding the effect of his impairment "on his day-to-day activities or the long-term impact of his 
striction." Lusk, 238 F.3d at 1241. 
End Footnotes [**6] 
)t every impairment necessitates a presentation of comparative evidence. Some impairments are 
bstantially limiting on their face. For example, in Lowe, we found that a multiple sclerosis patient was 
;abled within the meaning of the ADA upon a showing that she could not lift more than fifteen pounds 
a Document - Dy citation - 01 rea. /\ppx. oz / x CICLW u \JX \J 
absolutely and even less than fifteen pounds only on occasion. Lowe, 87 F.3d at 1174. HN7"?Because this 
mpairment was "substantially limiting on its face," we held that the plaintiff in Lowe did not have to 
)resent comparative evidence to withstand summary judgement. Id.; see also Luskf 238 F.3d at 1240-41. 
[ * 6 3 0 ] However, regarding the twenty-five pound lifting restriction at issue in this case, our precedents, 
3S well as those of our sister circuits, hold that such HN8~+a restriction is not substantially limiting on its 
ace. See Lusk, 238 F.3d at 1241, citing Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 
L997) (twenty-five pound lifting restriction is not a substantial limitation on the ability to l ift); Williams v. 
Zhannel Master Satellite Svs., Inc.. 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) T * *71 (same); see also Aucutt v. 
Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). To raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether he is disabled under the ADA, therefore, Velarde was required to present 
evidence comparing his lifting abilities to those of the general populace. Since he offered no such 
:omparative evidence, the district court properly granted summary judgment. 
/elarde argues that the district court's reasoning was flawed because "the question of whether a person is 
substantially limited in lifting should not develop into a per se rule (ability to lift over "x" pounds precludes 
a finding of disability) because each case should be analyzed on a case-by case basis." Appellant's Br. 23; 
>ee also id. at 28 (calling the requirement of comparative evidence "unreasonable and unwise"). But this 
nisconceives the principle of Lusk. Under Lusk, H/V9:?there is no "per se rule" precluding a finding of 
disability; rather, there is a threshold of severity of impairment below which the plaintiff bears the burden 
Df proving substantiality. This is precisely the case-by-case approach that Appellant professes to prefer. 
[n [ * * 8 ] addition to criticizing the legal framework this Court has adopted for determining the 
substantiality of impairment under the ADA, Plaintiff points to numerous facts demonstrating additional 
aspects of his impairment (other than the twenty-five pound lifting restriction) that he says substantially 
imit his engagement in major life activities. See Appellant's Br. at 18-20. Velarde presumably reads our 
jecision in Lusk as holding that even if the impairment is not substantial on its face and comparative 
evidence is not presented, a plaintiff can nevertheless avoid summary judgment by demonstrating that the 
lifting restriction coupled with additional impairments imposes a substantial limitation on major life 
activities. However, we have no need to consider the validity of this interpretation because, even accepting 
it arguendo, we find that Velarde failed to present a genuine issue of material fact. 
Appellant's factual assertions suffer from several defects, both procedural and substantive. Appellant 
introduces new evidence on appeal that was not part of the record before the district court on summary 
judgement, see Appellant's App. at 85-86, and relies on this evidence [ * * 9 ] to support a conclusion of 
substantial impairment. See Appellant's Brief at 7, 18. Additionally, Appellant's brief alleges numerous facts 
without appropriate citations to the record. See e.g. Appellants Br. at 11 P. 17; See also Fed. R. App. Proc. 
28(a)(7) ( ^^ "^Appe l lan t ' s brief must contain a statement of facts relevant to the issues submitted for 
review with appropriate references to the record). 
However, even aside from these procedural errors, Appellant has not offered sufficient evidence of 
substantial limitation on his daily functioning to overcome a summary judgment motion. In Toyota, the 
Supreme Court defined substantial impairment as "an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the 
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." 534 U.S. at 198. 
HNii-fin addressing "substantial l imitation" in the workplace context, the Court held that a claimant 
[ * 6 3 1 ] must show an inability to work in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 
Id. at 200. In this regard, the Court further held that the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is 
unable to perform central [ * * 1 0 ] daily tasks, rather than whether a claimant can perform the tasks 
associated with the claimant's particular job. Id. at 200-01. 
Velarde's allegations do not show how his impairments, even in the aggregate, substantially limit his overall 
daily functioning. n3 Rather, Appellant's arguments concentrate on how his impairments prevent him from 
performing the specific duties of his assigned job. See Appellant's Br. at 18. His assertions, even taken in 
the aggregate, thus do not meet the evidentiary requirements outlined by the Supreme Court in Toyota. 
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Footnotes 
5 Velarde attempts to point to Dr. Dall's diagnosis of March 27, 1995, to demonstrate "substantial 
lpairment." Dr. Dall found that Velarde should not twist or reach above his shoulder with his right arm, 
Jt could occasionally stoop, squat, crouch and reach at shoulder level. Further, Dr. Dall's diagnosis reports 
at Velarde could lift between 11-20 pounds occasionally. Appellant's Br. at 19, Appellee's App. at 172. 
lese findings do not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Velarde's impairments 
ibstantially limit major life activities. The EEOC Guidelines are clear that HN12~+\n determining substantial 
lpairment, the duration of such impairment must be considered. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii). 
)ecifically, the Guidelines state that the impairment's impact must be permanent or long term. Id.) see 
so Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. The impairments identified by Dr. Vail lasted less than two months. On May 
>, 1995, Dr. Lamb - Velarde's own doctor - released him for work, stating that "[Velarde] is released to 
turn to work for light duty. He should not lift repetitively or more that 25 lbs." Appellee's Br. at 6, 
)pellant's App. at 107. Thus we find that whatever additional impairments Velarde may have exhibited on 
arch 27, 1995 apparently subsided only two months later. 
End Footnotes [**11] 
»r the foregoing reasons we find that Appellant failed to make the necessary showing of substantial 
ipairment as outlined in Lusk and Toyota, and thus we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary 
dgement. 
JTERED FOR THE COURT 
chael W. McConnell 
rcuit Judge 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
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) ISPOSIT ION: [ * 1 ] Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant employer filed a motion for summary judgment in plaintiff 
ormer employee's action against defendant under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 5 
L2010 et seq., the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. 5 2601 et seq., and for wrongful 
ermination. 
3VERVIEW: Plaintiff former employee was a general manager at defendant employer's pizza stores. 
Plaintiff, to whom defendant already gave numerous warnings of violation of company policy, 
)bstructed defendant's audit of inventory. Plaintiff obtained a medical leave; during which defendant 
)erformed another audit and discovered that plaintiff misappropriated money and violated other 
:ompany policies. Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment after plaintiff did not contact 
Jefendant as requested. Plaintiff brought an action against defendant under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 5 12010 et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. 5 2601 et 
;eq., and for wrongful termination. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
entered judgment for defendant. Using the burden-shifting analysis, the court found that even if 
Plaintiff could make a prima facie case, plaintiff was unable to rebut defendant's legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for plaintiffs termination as pretext for discrimination. The court also found that 
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant's 
Jiscriminatory animus. 
3UTCOME: The court granted defendant employer's motion for summary judgment and entered 
udgment for defendant in plaintiff former employee's disability discrimination and wrongful 
.ermination action against defendant. The court found that plaintiff could not rebut defendant's non-
discriminatory reason for her termination as pretext for discrimination. The court also found that 
plaintiff failed show defendant's alleged discriminatory animus. 
ZORE TERMS: disability, summary judgment, termination, audit, impairment, restaurant, stress, 
nventory, anxiety, right-to-sue, deposition, deposit, prima facie case, depression, duration, employment 
i iscrimination, wrongful termination, legitimate reason, discrepancies, terminated, at-wil l, public policy, 
ion-discriminatory, burden-shifting, pretext, administrative remedies, statutory remedies, important 
)ublic, regulations, performing 
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jministrative Law > Judicial Review > Reviewability > Exhaustion of Remedies *" 
N1±A plaintiff must exhaust all required administrative remedies before bringing a claim for judicial 
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lbor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Other Laws ^ L l 
pnstitutional Law > Civil Rights Enforcement > Americans With Disabilities Act > Coverage * " 
N2±Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101, et seq., prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and vests the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission with responsibility for enforcing the ADA'S provisions, using remedies 
and procedures contained in Title VI I . 42 U.S.C.S. 5 12117(a). Thus, a party who brings an 
employment discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA must follow the administrative 
procedures set forth in Title V I I , 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5. Although this procedure is not 
jurisdictional, a party must exhaust these administrative remedies before suing in federal 
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institutional Law > Civil Rights Enforcement > Americans With Disabilities Act > Coverage ft" 
N3±Title VII of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101, et seq., provides 
that a charge of employment discrimination must be filed with the United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days after the alleged act of 
discrimination. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5(e)( l ) . If, however, the plaintiff initially files a complaint 
with a state or local fair-employment agency, she is allotted 300 days from the date of the 
alleged discrimination within which to file a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC. 
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V 5 ±Af te r filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a complainant must 
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in a suit filed prematurely where the notice of a right-to-sue is issued before 
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N6±A complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it asserts the 
satisfaction of the precondition to suit specified by Title VI I of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., prior to submission of the claim to the Equal Employment 
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prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with a disability. 42 
U.S.C.S. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, a qualified individual with a disability is a person who, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12111(8). More Like This Headnote 
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w s ± T o establish a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et 
seq., a plaintiff must first assert a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she either has a record of 
a disability or is regarded as disabled; (2) she is qualified for the job ; and (3) she suffers an 
adverse employment action. Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for the discharge. I f the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must 
then rebut the defendant's proffered reasons as pretext for discrimination. More Like This Headnote 
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HN9£"Disability" is defined as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2). "Major life activities" are 
defined in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations as caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 
29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(i). Although, emotional conditions such as anxiety and depression are 
disabilities included within the meaning of "disabled," temporary, non-chronic impairments of 
short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. 29 
C.F.R. § 1 6 3 0 . 2 ( j ) . More Like This Headnote 
_abor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *" 
wviOj^Only those impairments that "substantially" limit major life activities are covered by the 
regulations, which state that "substantially limits" means either the individual is unable to 
perform a major life activity, or, the individual is significantly restricted as to the condition, 
manner or duration under which she can perform the major life activity, when compared to the 
abilities of the average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) , app. (1). For 
an impairment to substantially limit one's ability to work, it must not merely prevent one from 
working a particular job ; it must prevent one from working at a class of jobs or a broad range 
of jobs in various classes. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. (3). Whether an impairment substantially 
limits a major life activity depends upon the following factors: (1) the nature and severity of 
the impairment; (2) the duration re expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the 
permanent or expected long term impact. 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(j), app. (2). More Like This Headnote 
Zivil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard 
.abor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *" 
HNII£ where a plaintiff asserts that she has an impairment that substantially limits her ability to 
work, she must present demographic evidence to show what jobs in her geographic area she 
has been excluded from due to her disability. Failure to do so is fatal to plaintiff at the 
summary judgment stage. More Like This Headnote 
Zivil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard *" 
,abor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Defenses & Exceptions *" 
HN12±Under the burden shifting analysis, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only by presenting 
direct or circumstantial evidence that can reasonably lead a factfinder to: (1) disbelieve the 
employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason is more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action. 
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One way to show that an illegitimate factor influenced the employment decision is by proving 
that the employer treats other, similarly situated persons not of his protected class more 
favorably. That is, the plaintiff can survive summary judgment by showing that each of the 
employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise 
did not actually motivate the employment action. More Like This Headnote 
ibor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Defenses & Exceptions **" 
^
I 3 i M e r e conjecture that an employer's explanation for an adverse employment action is pretext 
for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of summary judgment in an 
employment discrimination claim. A plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision 
was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus 
motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent. 
Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons 
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them "unworthy of credence," 
and hence infer that the employer does not act for the asserted non-discriminatory 
r e a s o n s . More Like This Headnote 
bor & Employment Law > Leaves of Absence > Family & Medical Leave * " 
V i 4±The Family and Medical Leave Act, (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.S. S 2601 et seq., grants an "eligible 
employee" the right to twelve work weeks of leave, over any period of twelve months: (1) 
because of the birth of the employee's child, in order to take care of the child; (2) because of 
the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) in order to care for 
the employee's child, spouse, or parent, if the child, spouse or parent has a serious health 
condition; or (4) because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 
perform the functions of the employee's position. 29 U.S.C.S. § 2612(a)(1). After a period of 
qualified leave, an employee is entitled to reinstatement to the former position or an equivalent 
one with the same benefits and terms. 29 U.S.C.S. § 2614(a). The FMLA similarly declares it 
unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any 
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C.S. 5 2615(a) 
( 2 ) . More Like This Headnote 
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¥ i 5±Under 29 U.S.C.S. § 2615(a)(2), the anti-retaliation provision of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 29 U.S.C.S. 5 2601 et seq., the appropriate analysis is burden-shifting 
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V i 6 ±An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of 
employment than if the employee is continuously employed during the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. 5 2601 et seq., leave period. 29 C.F.R. 5 825.216 
( a ) . More Like This Headnote 
bor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment * " 
v l 7 ±As a general rule, there is no common law cause of action against an employer for termination 
of an at-will employment relationship. Exceptions to this rule are recognized in only the most 
limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees would threaten clear mandates 
Of publ ic pol icy. More Like This Headnote 
bor 8c Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment *" 
Sil8±lt must first be determined whether any public policy is threatened thereby; and even when an 
important public policy is involved, an employer may discharge an employee if he has a 
separate, plausible and legitimate reason for doing so. Generally, the important public policies 
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fall into three categories: an employer cannot require an employee to commit a crime, cannot 
prevent an employee from complying with a statutorily imposed duty, and cannot discharge an 
employee when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute. More Like This Headnote 
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OPINION: MEMORANDUM 
3efore the court in this employment discrimination action is defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff alleges claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act 
"FMLA"), and for wrongful termination. For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motion will be 
granted. 
[. Background 
:n June, 1983, Plaintiff Mary Holmes began employment with Pizza Hut of America, Inc. ("Pizza Hut"). She 
was promoted to Assistant Manager in 1985 and to Manager in 1989. In August, 1990, she was transferred 
:o a restaurant in Lima, Pennsylvania, where she served as Restaurant General Manager. In addition to 
:hese promotions, plaintiff also received numerous warnings, both written and spoken, of violations of 
:ompany policy during her tenure at Pizza Hut. n l 
. Footnotes 
i l These warnings of violations ranged from not wearing the appropriate uniform and tardiness to failure to 
neet audit requirements and failure to verify deposits. Plaintiff was also suspended in April, 1991 for 
/iolation of policy # 625, a provision addressing employee absenteeism. 
• - End Footnotes- - - - [*2] 
!n the spring of 1996, Pizza Hut performed an audit on all Philadelphia area restaurants, including the one 
nanaged by plaintiff. The audit uncovered an overstatement of inventory by hundreds of dollars. This led to 
Dizza Hut's calling in, on May 10, 1996, an internal auditor to inventory plaintiff's restaurant. Pizza Hut 
ssserts that the inventory revealed "significant variances from the ideal usage figures." Def. Br. at 4. Pizza 
Hut alleges that plaintiff was present during the audit, refused to verify the discrepancies, and also refused 
:o open a storage shed for inspection. At her deposition, plaintiff stated that the internal audit was 
performed outside her presence, that she was never informed of any discrepancies, and that she never 
'efused to let anyone look in the storage shed. According to Pizza Hut, on May 15, 1996, plaintiff confirmed 
:he findings of the May 10 audit during her weekly inventory and explained that she was "catching things 
jp . " Plaintiff admits to having taken inventory, but denies finding any discrepancies. 
Dlaintiff states that on May 17, 1996, in accordance with her doctor's orders, she requested a week of 
eave. n2 At that t ime, she had not actually [ * 3 ] been examined by her physician, Dr. Su Kenderdine, but 
•ather, she had explained her symptoms over the telephone. During plaintiff's phone conversation with Dr. 
Cenderdine's office, she requested that Dr. Kenderdine send a note to Pizza Hut indicating plaintiffs need 
:or t ime off. The note, dated May 17, was not received by Pizza Hut until May 2 1 , 1996, but stated that 
Plaintiff had been under Dr. Kenderdine's care from May 17 through May 19. n3 After examining plaintiff on 
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ay 2 1 , Dr. Kenderdine sent a second note to Pizza Hut stating that plaintiff required leave from May 22 to 
ay 28 because of "acute stress related anxiety." Pizza Hut alleges that it never received Dr. Kenderdine's 
ay 22 note, but that it did not deny plaintiff leave. 
Footnotes - -
2 Because of understaffing at the restaurant, plaintiff worked her regular schedule until May 2 1 , 1996. 
3 Pizza Hut contends that they were not informed of plaintiffs request for leave until their receipt of the 
ote on May 2 1 , 1996. 
End Footnotes 
n May 23, 1996, while plaintiff [ * 4 ] was on leave, Ms. McCartney and Connie Dillon, Pizza Hut's Area 
anager in the Philadelphia market, performed a second audit of plaintiff's restaurant. The second audit 
jvealed that plaintiff was misappropriating money, violating cash control procedures, failing to properly 
laintain the deposit log, and depositing funds untimely - actions which violated Pizza Hut policy # 913. 
n May 28, 1996, the last day of plaintiff's requested leave, Dr. Kenderdine wrote a third note to Pizza Hut, 
ating that plaintiff required an additional ten days to two weeks of leave. On May 29th, Pizza Hut sent 
aintiff a letter stating that her medical leave would be counted as FMLA leave. On that same date, Ms. 
illon sent plaintiff a letter asking plaintiff to contact her immediately, and that her failure to do so would 
B considered an abandonment of her position with Pizza Hut. Plaintiff called Ms. Dillon's secretary to report 
lat she was still under her doctor's care. Plaintiff did not attempt to speak directly with Ms. Dillon. On June 
1996, Pizza Hut sent plaintiff a letter notifying her that she was "on suspension pending further internal 
jd i t investigation," and that "should this investigation [ * 5 ] prove reasons for termination and you do not 
lake contact with me, termination will be executed through the U.S. Mail." Plaintiff received the June 6 
tter on June 7. Based on Dr. Kenderdine's instruction to have no contact with people from Pizza Hut, 
aintiff did not attempt to contact Ms. Dillon. On June 14, 1996, Pizza Hut sent plaintiff a letter informing 
sr that: 
The internal audit investigation found manipulation of cash control, inventory and P&A, all in 
violation of company policy 913. Furthermore, these infractions all occurred on days that you 
were scheduled, on duty and prior to your medical leave. In accordance with Pizza Hut's policies 
and disciplinary procedures, these infractions are terms for immediate termination. 
aintiff received the termination letter on June 18, 1996. At her deposition, plaintiff denied knowledge of 
zza Hut's investigations, and denied that she violated Pizza Hut policy. 
[. Discussion 
. ADA Claim 
efendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's ADA claim on the grounds that she has failed to 
(haust her administrative remedies, that she is not a "qualified individual with a disability" within the 
eaning [ * 6 ] of the ADA, and that she was not discriminated against on the basis of any disability. 
. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
t is a basic tenet of administrative law that H / V i 7a plaintiff must exhaust all required administrative 
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emedies before bringing a claim for judicial relief." Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 
.997) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 23 L Ed. 2d 194, 89 S. Ct. 1657 (1969)). HN2 
PTitle I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of 
Usability and vests the EEOC with responsibility for enforcing the ADA'S provisions, using remedies and 
)rocedures contained in Title V I I . See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Thus, a party who brings an employment 
liscrimination claim under Title I of the ADA must follow the administrative procedures set forth in Title V I I , 
12 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Although this procedure is not jurisdictional, a party must exhaust these 
administrative remedies before suing in federal court. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 
S96, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982). 
W3
"?Title VI I provides that a charge of employment discrimination must [ * 7 ] be filed with the United 
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days after the alleged act of 
liscrimination. 42 U.S.C 5 2000e-5(e) ( l ) . If, however, the plaintiff initially filed a complaint with a state or 
ocal fair-employment agency, she is allotted 300 days from the date of the alleged discrimination within 
vhich to file a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Therefore, 
;ince plaintiff here filed a complaint with the PHRC, she had 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination 
n which to bring a charge with the EEOC. See Davis v. Calqon Corp., 627 F.2d 674, 675 (3d Cir. 1980) (per 
:uriam) (holding 300-day limitations period applied even though plaintiff's filing with state agency was 
jnt imely). 
Defendant argues that because plaintiff neither dually filed with the PHRC and the EEOC, nor filed with the 
EEOC itself, within the appropriate time frame, she cannot now sue in federal court. HN4fA federal court 
acks jurisdiction to hear a Title VI I claim, unless the plaintiff has filed a charge with the EEOC. Woodson v. 
Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 926 (3d Cir. 1997). However, many state and local fair employment [ * 8 ] 
agencies have entered into contracts and "work-sharing agreements" with the EEOC providing that the 
iling with the state agency constitutes a filing with the EEOC and visa versa. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(i i); 
5ee, e.g., Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp., 857 F. Supp. 430, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that under worksharing 
agreement, complaint filed with Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, municipal agency created 
)ursuant to Philadelphia Municipal Code and § 962.1 of PHRA, is deemed filed with EEOC). Thus, a PHRC 
:omplaint can be deemed filed with the EEOC, despite the fact that plaintiff did not indicate on her PHRC 
:omplaint that she was requesting a dual fil ing. 
f / V 57After filing with the EEOC, a complainant must await the EEOC's determination and issuance of a 
ight-to-sue letter before filing suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) ; See also Reddinqer v. Hosp. 
lental Servs., 4 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("To properly sue an employer under the ADA, a 
plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the [EEOC] and receive a right to sue letter."). Courts 
lave dismissed cases in which the plaintiff filed suit but failed to receive a notice of [ * 9 ] a right to sue. 
See, e.g. Kent v. Director, Missouri Dep't Elem. and Secondary Educ, 792 F. Supp. 59, 62 (E.D. Mo. 1992) 
holding that a right-to-sue letter is a statutory, not a jurisdictional, prerequisite). "However, the Third 
Circuit has held that it is proper to waive the EEOC administrative process in a suit filed prematurely where 
:he notice of a right-to-sue is issued before trial." Lantz v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1996 U.S. 
)ist. LEXIS 11154, * 8 , No. 96-2671, 1996 WL 442795, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1996) (citing Molthan v. 
femple University, 778 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
The plaintiff here does not have a right-to-sue letter. Nor has either party provided the information 
lecessary for this court to determine whether plaintiff, at this t ime, could cure thus procedural lacuna by 
•equesting and receiving a right-to-sue letter before trial. Thus, this court cannot establish whether plaintiff 
las exhausted her administrative remedies, and accordingly, whether she lacks a legal claim upon which 
elief can be granted. See Hornsby v. United States Postal Service, 787 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1986) HN6~?("A 
:omplaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it asserts [ * 1 0 ] the satisfaction 
)f the precondition to suit specified by Title V I I : prior submission of the claim to the EEOC (or a state 
xmciliation agency) for conciliation or resolution."). However, I find that even if plaintiff obtained the 
equired right-to-sue letter, she would not be able to survive summary judgment on the merits of her ADA 
:laim. 
i JL^UL/Uiiiv^iii - uy \^ i ta t iun - U \ J j^au. \^ao. v^v-/JL±y r J J , / ^ I r d g c o ui i<+ 
. Disability Under the ADA 
V77Section 12112 of the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against "qualified individuals with a 
sability." 42 U.S.C. 5 12112(a). Under the ADA, "a qualified individual with a disability" is a person "who, 
ith or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position 
lat such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. 5 12111(8). 
v sTTo establish a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must first assert a prima facie case of discrimination. 
cDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 802, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). n4 This court has 
Bid that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she 
ther had a record of a disability or was regarded as disabled; (2) she was qualified for the job; and (3) 
le [ * 1 1 ] suffered an adverse employment action. Doe v. Kohn, Nast, & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 
318 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden 
lifts to the defendant to produce evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the discharge. Id . 
the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then rebut the defendant's proffered reasons as 
"etext for discrimination. Id . 
Footnotes 
\ In order for a plaintiff to establish a case of disparate treatment under the ADA, the Third Circuit has 
Dplied the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas. See Lawrence v. Westminster Bank New Jersey, 
3 F.3d 6 1 , 68 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 & n.13, 36 L 
J, 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973^ . 
- End Footnotes 
/en assuming that plaintiff could make out her prima facie case and establish that she suffered from a 
lysical or mental impairment covered by the ADA, n5 and that she was substantially limited in the major 
e [ * 1 2 ] activity of working, n6 she is unable to rebut Pizza Hut's legitimate reason for her termination 
; pretext for discrimination, and has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 
aterial fact as to defendant's discriminatory animus. 
Footnotes - -
5 I t is unclear, in fact, whether plaintiff can make out her prima facie case of disability. " " " " D i s a b i l i t y " is 
ifined as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
:tivities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
lpairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). "Major life activities," in turn, are defined in the EEOC regulations as 
aring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
orking." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Although, "emotional conditions such as anxiety and depression are 
sabilities included within the meaning of 'disabled,'" Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
325, at * 6 , No. 93 C 6454, 1994 WL 262175, at *3 (N.D. III. June 10, 1994) (citations omitted), 
emporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, 
e usually not disabilities." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.2(j). See Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 
L F.3d 1351 f 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1116, 117 S. Ct. 1247, 137 L Ed. 2d 329 
997) (holding that psychological disorder triggered by cancer, lasting less than four months, and having 
) residual effects was not a "disability" under the ADA); see also McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 
5 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that disabling, but transitory, abdominal injury was not disability under ADA). 
ere, plaintiff's alleged disability was of limited duration. The date of onset of the alleged disability was on 
• about May 17, 1996. (At her deposition, plaintiff stated that she self-diagnosed her stress, anxiety and 
>pression in March, 1996. However, she has not submitted any medical documentation of an allegedly 
, a JJocument - Dy citation - u o j^ao. ^as. ^ ^ n ; r :o , / z i r ag t / 7 U i i t 
debilitating condition prior to the May 17, 1996 note from Dr. Kenderdine. Even had plaintiffs condition 
commenced in March, still the condition was not of long duration nor could it be considered chronic.) 
Relatively soon after Pizza Hut notified her of the termination of her employment, on June 14, 1996, 
plaintiff stated on her application for unemployment compensation that she was able to fully resume work. 
In fact, she began part-time work on September 3, 1996. Indeed, her own physician stated that plaintiff 
suffered from "acute severe situational depression," (emphasis added), and further commented that 
plaintiff did not have "any preexisting depression or poor mechanism for stress control." This evidence 
tends to show that plaintiff cannot be considered disabled as her stress and anxiety was of a transitory and 
episodic nature. Any work impairment plaintiff may have suffered was merely temporary; to be protected 
by the ADA, a plaintiffs disability must be a permanent or long-term limitation. [ * 1 3 ] 
n6 Even if plaintiff did establish that she had an impairment that qualified as a disability, H / V I ( r?only those 
impairments that "substantially" limit major life activities are covered by the regulations, which state that 
"substantially limits" means either the individual is unable to perform a major life activity, or, the individual 
is "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration" under which she can perform the major 
life activity, when compared to the abilities of the average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2( j ) ( l ) . For an impairment to substantially limit one's ability to work, it must not merely prevent one 
from working a particular job ; it must prevent one from working at a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs 
in various classes. 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(i)(3). "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not 
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
"Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity depends upon the following factors: (1) the 
nature and severity of the impairment, (2) the duration re expected duration of the impairment, and (3) 
the permanent or expected long term impact." Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 
(5th Cir. 1998)(citing 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2)); Brown v. Lankenau Hosp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7289, 
No. Civ. 95-7829, 1997 WL 277354, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 1997). 
It is thus insufficient for plaintiff to show that her alleged disability prevented her from continuing in her 
position as manager of the Pizza Hut restaurant. Instead, she must show that she was precluded from 
performing a broader class of potential jobs for a person with her vocational skills and training. Plaintiff has 
Failed, however, to present any evidence in this regard. H/VI1"?Where a plaintiff asserts that she has an 
impairment that substantially limits her ability to work, she "must present demographic evidence to show 
what jobs in her geographic area she has been excluded from due to her disability." Taylor v. Phoenixville 
5ch. Dist., 998 F. Supp. 561 , 568 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citation omitted) (addressing plaintiffs burden under 
the ADA). Failure to do so is fatal to plaintiff at the summary judgment stage. Id . (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff has presented no evidence detailing the class of jobs from which she is foreclosed or how she is 
limited in the major life activity of working, other than her claim that she was unable to work at one 
particular Pizza Hut restaurant. Statements made at her deposition suggest that plaintiffs stress and 
anxiety resulted from understaffing at the restaurant she managed, which her own physician termed a 
"causative work environment." Moreover, on her claim petition for worker's compensation benefits, plaintiff 
described her alleged disability as "work related stress, anxiety depression." This evidence is not sufficient 
to establish that she was precluded from working a particular class of jobs. See Gaul v. Lucent 
Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101 
F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996) ("we strongly suspect that a plaintiff who is unable to work with individuals 
who cause him 'prolonged and inordinate stress' cannot be said to be incapable of performing a 'class of 
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.'"). 
. End Footnotes [*14] 
Pizza Hut contends that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant's reasons for her 
discharge are pretextual or that disability played any role in the challenged actions. Pizza Hut argues that it 
had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff, specifically, that plaintiff was terminated 
for violating Pizza Hut policy 913. n7 The Enforcement provision of this policy states: 
i j-yw^uinv^iit - uy y^LiaiLVLi - LJ\J juau. v^ao. yy^^iij I J J , / ^ I r a g e lv ui i^ + 
PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE, manipulation, falsification of documents, or willful non-compliance 
with this policy will result in the immediate termination of the employee(s) involved. 
ie defendants have submitted evidence demonstrating plaintiff's violation of policy 913 and have thus met 
leir burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination of plaintiffs 
nployment. Accordingly, the burden has shifted to the plaintiff to specify facts showing that a genuine 
sue exists regarding the reasons for her termination. 
Footnotes 
7 Pizza Hut policy 913 states, in relevant part, that: 
On a daily basis, one deposit containing the prior day's receipts must be taken to the bank 
before the unit opens for business; 
The closing [management person in charge] must count the shift funds and prepare a deposit, 
including the completion of a deposit slip reflecting the deposit amount; 
Only the Unit Manager, Assistant Managers and Shift Managers are allowed to compile and 
make deposits; 
Only the Unit Manager, Assistant Manager and Shift Managers are allowed access to the safe 
and possession of keys/combination to the safe. 
uring internal audit ing, plaintiff was found to have violated each of these provisions. 
End Footnotes - - [*15] 
^
12f Under the McDonnell burden shifting analysis, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only by 
esenting direct or circumstantial evidence that could reasonably lead a factfinder to "(1) disbelieve the 
nployer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more 
:ely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
)9, 764 (3d Cir. 19941. One way to show that an illegitimate factor influenced the employment decision is 
f proving that "the employer treated other, similarly situated persons not of his protected class more 
vorably." Id . at 765. That is, the plaintiff can survive summary judgment by showing that "each of the 
nployer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not 
:tually motivate the employment action." Id . at 764 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
*
i5
"?Mere conjecture that an employer's explanation for an adverse employment action is pretext for 
tentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of summary judgment in an employment 
scrimination claim. A "plaintiff cannot simply [ * 1 6 ] show that the employer's decision was wrong or 
istaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not 
hether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. "Rather, the non-
oving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or 
mtradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 
)uld rationally find them 'unworthy of credence,' ... and hence infer 'that the employer did not act for the 
;serted non-discriminatory reasons.'" Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original) (internal citations 
id brackets omitted). 
a J^UL/UinciiL - uy v^iiauuii - LJKJ i^au. v^ao. y^K^nj JL ^ ^ , / Z . I i «^V-< A A V^ JL JL-T 
:n her brief, plaintiff argues that: 
The Defendant has failed to articulate a single reason why the investigation into the alleged 
discrepancies in the audit procedures could not have been conducted upon the completion of 
the Plaintiffs family medical leave. The absence of this explanation negates the legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the Plaintiffs termination. 
^I.'s Br. at 4. Plaintiffs argument is insufficient to overcome summary judgment. Pizza Hut's audit [ * 1 7 ] 
}f plaintiffs restaurant, which revealed inventory and cash discrepancies, took place before she requested 
eave or notified Pizza Hut of her alleged disability. Plaintiff admits receiving notification that she was under 
nvestigation for various violations of company policy, including manipulation of cash control. Moreover, she 
admits that the notifications defendant sent to her included requests that plaintiff contact Pizza Hut's 
•epresentative to discuss the allegations. Plaintiff stated at her deposition that she did not contact Pizza Hut 
Jespite its request that she do so because her doctor had instructed her not to have any contact with 
Deople from Pizza Hut, since her employment was the cause of her stress and anxiety. Plaintiff, an at-will 
employee, gave defendant no reason to delay its investigation, and indeed it was under no obligation to do 
so. Other than her own denials, plaintiff has also not presented any evidence to establish that the 
allegations that she violated company policy were in any way fabricated or untrue. Since plaintiff has not 
Dresented evidence showing that her disability was, more likely than not, a determinative cause for the 
decision, plaintiffs [ * 1 8 ] ADA claim cannot survive summary judgment. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
any discrimination on the part of the defendant; thus, summary judgment must be entered in favor of the 
defendant on plaintiff's ADA claim. 
3. Family and Medical Leave Act 
w i 4 - y T h e F a m i | y a n d Medical Leave Act, ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. 55 2601 et seq., grants an "eligible 
employee" the right to twelve work weeks of leave, over any period of twelve months: (1) because of the 
Dirth of the employee's child, in order to take care of the child; (2) because of the placement of a child with 
:he employee for adoption or foster care; (3) in order to care for the employee's child, spouse, or parent, if 
:he child, spouse or parent has a serious health condition; or (4) because of a serious health condition that 
nakes the employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's position. 29 U.S.C. 5 2612(a)(1). 
\ f ter a period of qualified leave, an employee is entitled to reinstatement to the former position or an 
equivalent one with the same benefits and terms. 29 U.S.C. 5 2614(a). The FMLA declares it "unlawful for 
any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, [ * 1 9 ] any 
igh t provided" in the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. 5 2615(a)(1). The FMLA similarly declares it "unlawful for any 
employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice 
nade unlawful" under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. 5 2615(aX2). 
Plaintiff states that she "was entitled to FMLA protection, she invoked the protections, complied with the 
•equirements and was terminated." PL's Br. at 9. I t is unclear whether plaintiff's claim falls under § 2615(a) 
1), based on Pizza Hut's failure to restore her to her former position or its equivalent after her FMLA leave 
ended, or whether it is a claim of retaliatory discharge under § 2615(a)(2). n8 Although her allegations 
suggest retaliation, I find that under the standard for either provision, plaintiff's FMLA claim must fail. 
• Footnotes 
i8 In her complaint and brief, Plaintiff alleges that she requested and was denied leave prior to the leave 
hat commenced in May 22, 1996. At her deposition, plaintiff clarified that her first request for leave was on 
^lay 17, 1996. However, plaintiff has not argued that she is entitled to relief for any denial of leave under § 
'615(a)(1). 
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End Footnotes [*20] 
ost courts have held that H / V i 5 ?under § 2615(a)(2) — the anti-retaliation provision of the FMLA - the 
ppropriate analysis is McDonnell's burden-shifting approach. See Williams v. Shenanqo, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 
09, 318 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (quoting Kavlor v. Fannin Regional Hospital, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 996-97 
sl.D. Ga. 1996)) ("'Congress clearly contemplated that the proper framework for analyzing a retaliation 
aim based on certain circumstantial evidence under § 2615(a)(2) of the FMLA is the shifting burdens of 
roof analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 
817 (1973). '") However, at least one Circuit Court has rejected the use of the McDonnell burden-shifting 
nalysis for substantive FMLA claims, under § 2615(a)(1). Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that in ruling 
n a summary judgment motion a court should "ask[ ] whether the plaintiff has established, by a 
reponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the benefit he claims." Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry 
orp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997). 
s discussed above, under the burden-shifting analysis, plaintiff has not shown that defendant's [ * 2 1 ] 
gitimate reason for the termination of her employment was a pretext for discrimination. Moreover, the 
jcord clearly shows that plaintiff would have been terminated regardless of whether she was out on 
rotected FMLA leave. The alleged violations of defendant's company policy took place prior to her 
Dproved FMLA leave, and plaintiff has presented no evidence to suggest that her employment was 
irminated for the exercise of her rights under the FMLA rather than as a consequence of committing those 
olations. The FMLA regulations state that HN16~+"an employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to 
:her benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during 
le FMLA leave period." 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a). The reinstatement to her position as Manager upon 
'turning from her approved FMLA leave is not something to which plaintiff would otherwise have been 
ntitled. The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff's employment would have been terminated because 
:
 her violations of company policy regardless of whether or not she had taken FMLA leave. 
ccordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs FMLA claim will be granted. [ * 2 2 ] 
. Wrongful Termination 
zza Hut also moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's wrongful termination claim. In Geary v. United 
Lates Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first set forth 
le possibility of a wrongful discharge claim of an at-will employee. In dicta, the Geary court stated that an 
:tion for wrongful discharge might exist only when a clear mandate of public policy is violated and where 
iere is no plausible and legitimate reason for terminating the at-wil l relationship. Id . at 180. Since Geary, 
has been clarified that: H /V i7"7"as a general rule, there is no common law cause of action against an 
nployer for termination of an at-will employment relationship . . . Exceptions to this rule have been 
icognized in only the most limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees would threaten 
ear mandates of public policy." Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917, 
18 (Pa. 1989) (citations omitted). 
V I#5>I t
 m u s t first be determined whether any public policy is threatened thereby; and even when an 
iportant public policy is involved, an employer may discharge an employee if [ * 2 3 ] he has a separate, 
ausible and legitimate reason for doing so." Burkholder v. Hutchison, 403 Pa. Super. 498, 589 A.2d 721 , 
23 (Pa. Super. 1991). n9 Here, even if there exists an important public policy, plaintiff has presented no 
/idence to counter defendant's legitimate reason for the termination of her employment. Plaintiff has 
tiled to establish a causal link between her request for medical leave and the termination of her 
nployment. She has in no way demonstrated that her termination resulted from the exercise of her right 
) medical leave for an alleged disability or serious health condition. For this reason, her common-law 
rongful-termination claim, like her federal statutory claims, cannot withstand defendant's motion for 
jmmary judgment. nlO 
Footnotes 
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n9 Generally, the important public policies "fall into three categories: an employer cannot require an 
employee to commit a crime, cannot prevent an employee from complying with a statutorily imposed duty, 
3nd cannot discharge an employee when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute." Shick v. Shirey, 
456 Pa. Super. 668, 691 A.2d 511 , 513 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations omitted). [ * 2 4 ] 
nlO Even if plaintiff could establish a cause of action for wrongful termination, she still could not recover. 
The "only Pennsylvania cases applying public policy exceptions have done so where no statutory remedies 
were available." Bruffett v. Warner Comm., Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 919 (3d Cir. 1982): see also Clay, 559 A.2d 
at 918-19 (Pa. 1989) (citations omitted) ("Nevertheless, inasmuch as appellees failed to pursue their 
exclusive statutory remedy for sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace, they are precluded 
From relief."). Here, the plaintiff has statutory remedies available, namely under PHRA, ADA and FMLA, and 
is in fact pursuing these remedies. See Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F. Supp. 949, 957 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding 
plaintiff-employees could not pursue wrongful discharge claim for racial discrimination against employer 
where they had statutory remedies available to them in form of Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Section 
1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). Because the statutes protect the same interests and provide 
relief for the same violations that plaintiff alleges, and she has also brought claims under these statutes, 
summary judgment is warranted on plaintiff's wrongful termination claim. 
End Footnotes [*25] 
An order follows. 
O R D E R 
MMD NOW, this 28th day of August, 1998, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Judgment is entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendants. 
BY THE COURT: 
Robert S. Gawthrop, I I I J. 
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CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff employee appealed summary judgment by the United States 
District Court, Northern District, Oklahoma, for defendant United States Postal Service on claim that 
:he Postal Service discriminated against him in its employment practices in violation of Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.S. 55 791 and 794. 
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff employee appealed summary judgment for defendant United States Postal 
Service on claim that the Postal Service discriminated against him in its employment practices, in 
/iolation of Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.S. 55 791 and 794, by failing to make 
-easonable accommodation for a disability. The court affirmed. I t held that his long-term physical 
•estriction against lifting more than 35 pounds was not a substantial enough limitation on the major 
ife activity of lifting to qualify him as disabled under the Act, while his more severe impairments 
asted less than three months, too short a time to qualify as disabilities under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 55 12101-12213. Nor was 
plaintiff entitled to protection because defendant perceived him as disabled; a reasonable factfinder 
:ould not have found his evidence sufficient to show defendant so perceived him. 
DUTCOME: The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant employer on claim defendant 
Jiscriminated against plaintiff employee in employment practices, violating Vocational Rehabilitation 
\ct of 1973, by failing to make reasonable accommodation for plaintiffs disability. Long-term 
•estriction against lifting over 35 pounds was not substantial enough to qualify him as disabled. 
30RE TERMS: impairment, l ift ing, pound, disability, disabled, Rehabilitation Act, return to work, light duty, 
hirty-f ive, ful l-t ime, lift, duty, discriminated, disabled person, average person, duration, substantially 
mpaired, prima facie case, summary judgment, short duration, twenty-f ive, permanent, correctly, 
weighing, lasting, granting summary judgment, entitled to protection, letter carrier, oral argument, sick 
save 
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3PINIONBY: BOBBY R. BALDOCK 
DPINION: ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
• - - Footnotes -
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res 
udicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; 
levertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
End Footnotes 
Vfter examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the 
>arties' [ * 2 ] request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th 
j r . R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 
Maintiff Phillip E. Huckans appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
lefendant United States Postal Service on Huckans' claim that the Postal Service discriminated against him 
n its employment practices in violation of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 and 
'94. H N 1 t W e review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal 
tandards used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 
330, 1337 (10th Cir. 1997). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court's decision. 
luckans began working for the Postal Service in 1988, and was a thirty percent disabled veteran, ten 
•ercent of which related to a cervical spine problem. In December 1995, Huckans was employed as a full-
ime letter carrier at the Postal Service's West Tulsa facility when he fell at work and aggravated his back, 
ight hip and right leg. He was treated by medical personnel [ * 3 ] and returned to work the next day. On 
larch 9, 1996, he experienced an unbearable back pain at work related to his December injury. His 
nedical providers released him from work until April 30. In early April, Huckans requested advance sick 
save, submitting medical documentation indicating he would probably be able to return to work. The Postal 
iervice denied this request, ostensibly on the basis that it did not include an expected date for return to 
uty. 
)n April 30, Huckans' medical providers released him to return to work with the following restrictions: no 
rolonged walking, standing, sitt ing, stooping, squatting or running; no lifting over twenty pounds; and no 
riving. On that day, he requested that the Postal Service allow him to work on temporary, light duty 
ssignments. He was allowed to return to light work on May 16, working two and one-half hours a day. 
luckans requested that he be allowed to receive donated leave under the Postal Service's leave sharing 
rogram on May 8. Although his request was denied by mistake, Huckans contends that the effect was to 
a. uocument - oy ^nation - ivy^ ^oiu. J. \^./\.r^. o t^ju j r a^^ •* u i u i 
eprive him of his rights. 
»n June 5, 1996, Huckans' doctor released him to return to work full-t ime with the only [ * 4 ] restriction 
eing that he not lift more than thirty-five pounds. He returned to his ful l-t ime letter carrier position the 
ext day. He contends that this lifting restriction prevents him from performing all of his carrier duties, but 
ie record does not indicate what duties he cannot perform. 
i September 1997, he filed this action alleging that the Postal Service violated the Rehabilitation Act by 
ailing to make reasonable accommodation for his disability. In his complaint, and in his subsequently filed 
apers, Huckans does not contend that the Postal Service discriminated against him in any way following 
is return to full-t ime work on June 6, 1996. Instead, as the district court summarized his claim, he 
ontends that it 
violated the Act by discriminating against him based on physical disability; denying [his] 
request for advanced sick leave on or about April 29, 1996; denying [his] request for donated 
annual leave on or about May 16, 1996; and denying [him] light duty from April 30, 1996 until 
May 16, 1996 and denying [him] appropriate light duty from May 16, 1996 until June 6, 1996. 
ppellant's App. at 280 (district court's December 23, 1998 order granting [ * 5 ] summary judgment at 1). 
i granting summary judgment to the Postal Service, the district court concluded that Huckans' restriction 
n lifting more than thirty-f ive pounds was not a substantial enough limitation to qualify him as disabled 
nder the Act. On appeal, Huckans contends that that conclusion was error. He also contends that he 
resented evidence showing he is entitled to protection under the Act because the Postal Service perceived 
im as disabled. 
/V2
"?The Rehabilitation Act provides that "no otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 
tates . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be . . . subjected to discrimination under any 
rogram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an 
xecutive agency or by the United States Postal Service." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). H /V5TTo make a prima facie 
ase under the Act, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is a disabled person within the meaning of the Act; (2) 
hat he is otherwise qualified for the job ; and (3) that he was discriminated against because of his 
isability. See HN4T Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1338. A disabled person within [ * 6 ] the meaning of the Act is 
ny person who "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
erson's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an 
npairment." 29 U.S.C. 5 706(8KB) (1996) (recodified in 1998 as 29 U.S.C. 5 705(20HB)). 
luckans claims that he is disabled under the Act because he is substantially impaired in the major life 
ctivity of "l i ft ing." In Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc.. 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996), we held 
hat ^ ^ " l i f t i n g " is a major life activity. n2 The question then becomes whether Huckans is substantially 
npaired in that activity because he is restricted to lifting no more than thirty-f ive pounds. 
- Footnotes 
i2 In Lowe, we were interpreting the w/V6"?Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, but 
^DA cases are generally applicable to Rehabilitation Act cases and vice-versa. See 29 U.S.C. 5 794(d) 
requiring standards applied under ADA to be applied to claims under Rehabilitation Act); Woodman, L32 
.3d at 1339 n.8. 
Encj Footnotes [*7] 
before we answer that question, we need to back up a little and explain, as best we can, why it is crucial to 
I. U J ^ V W U l l l V i l l L/Y V y l W U U V l l - X S S S W 1 V . J . V^.^^V.JLV. U T J U r a ^ J U I U 
Huckans' claim to find this limitation on his ability to lift to be a disability. At first glance, it would appear 
that this limitation is irrelevant. After all, it was included in his doctor's release that allowed him to return 
to his regular job on a full-t ime basis, and it has not prevented him from performing that job, apparently 
satisfactorily and without any accommodations by the Postal Service. n3 Moreover, he claims the Postal 
Service discriminated against him only during the period prior to his return to work with this alleged 
disability, when his impairments, i.e., lifting no more than twenty pounds, no driving, limited standing, 
walking and sitting, were even more severe. 
- - Footnotes 
n3 Although Huckans contends that he cannot perform all the duties of his job, he has not indicated what 
those unperformed duties are, and neither he nor the Postal Service has indicated that it has had to make 
any "reasonable accommodations" to allow him to work. 
End Footnotes [*8] 
These more severe impairments, however, lasted less than three months. H / V 77Two of the factors relevant 
to determining whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity are the duration or 
expected duration of the impairment and the permanent or expected long-term impact of the impairment. 
See 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(i)(2)( i i ) , ( i i i ) ; McGuinness v. University ofN.M. Sch. of Medicine, 170 F.3d 974, 978 
f lOth Cir. 1998), cert, denied, HN*+ 143 L. Ed. 2d 518, 119 S. Ct. 1357 (1999). Further, the appendix to 
29 C.F.R. Part 1630, providing "interpretive guidance," explains that "temporary, non-chronic impairments 
Df short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. Such 
impairments may include, but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, 
and influenza." 
Given this criteria for determining whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity, it 
appears that Huckans presumed—correctly, we might add—that he could not ground his claim on any 
alleged disability lasting only the three months prior to his return to work. See Sorensen v. University of 
T*91 Utah Hosp.. 194 F.3d 1084, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25534, 1999 WL 820213, at *3-4 (10th Cir. 
L999) (finding impairment lasting less than three weeks of too short duration to be disability under ADA); 
Zolwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir. 1998) (same, seven months), cert, 
ienied, 526 U.S. 1018, 143 L. Ed. 2d 350, 119 S. Ct. 1253 (1999); Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp.. 128 
=
,3d 191, 200 (4th Cir.1997) (same, two months); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 
9th Cir. 1996) (same, less than four months); McDonald v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare, Polk 
Zenter, 62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1995) (same, less than two months). He thus pins his hopes on establishing 
lis thirty-five pound lifting restriction, which apparently has a long term impact, as a disability sufficient to 
make a prima facie case under the Act. 
Even were we to accept the theory behind his claim, it would be of no avail to Huckans because he has not 
jhown that he is substantially limited in his ability to perform a major life activity. We agree with the 
iistrict court—and with a number of other circuits—that [ * 1 0 ] HN9~+the thirty-f ive pound restriction is not 
m impairment substantially limiting the major life activity of lifting. See Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 
,21 F.3d 537, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding restriction from lifting more than twenty-five pounds not 
;ubstantially l imiting); Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996) 
same), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1240 (1997); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 
.319 (8th Cir.1996) (same); see also Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 785-786 (3d 
j r . 1998) (evidence that plaintiff could not lift over fifty pounds or carry over twenty-five pounds 
requently combined with plaintiff's "very low employment opportunities" created issue of fact as to 
vhether plaintiff disabled). n4 Huckans' lifting restriction therefore does not qualify him as a disabled 
)erson under the Act. 
Footnotes 
uocumeni - oy ^luuiun - iyyy \^uiu J ^ r\ r^ u t j u 
'& 
I We note that HNIc r7an impairment is substantially limiting when it renders a person unable to perform 
ajor life activities that the average person can perform, or when it significantly restricts the condition, 
anner, or duration under which he or she can perform the major life activity as compared to an average 
Tson. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2Q)(l)(i) & (u); see also Lowe. 87 F.3d at 1173. Huckans has presented no 
/ j t l7evidence comparing his lifting restriction with the capabilities of an average person. While such 
ridence is not necessary where the impairment is facially substantially limiting, see id at 1174 (not 
quiring comparative evidence for plaintiff who was "unable to lift items weighing more than fifteen 
>unds and . . .[who] should lift items weighing less than fifteen pounds only occasionally."), Huckans' 
ilure to present such evidence reinforces the conclusion that his impairment is not substantially limiting. 
End Footnotes - [*11] 
jckans also argues that he is entitled to protection under the Act because the Postal Service perceived 
m as disabled. The basis for this contention is his testimony that when he asked for work on April 30, 
ter he had been released for work with the variety of restrictions noted earlier, his supervisor told him 
ere was no work for him and that there was nothing he could do to be productive. However, Huckans also 
stifled that at this same meeting, the supervisor suggested that he request light duty work as allowed 
ider the collective bargaining agreement, and two weeks later, he was provided with a light duty job We 
) not agree with Huckans that a reasonable factfinder could find this evidence sufficient to show that the 
)stal Service perceived him as disabled. 
le district court correctly concluded that Huckans had not shown he was a disabled individual subject to 
e protections of the Rehabilitation Act. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
itered for the Court 
)bby R. Baldock 
rcuit Judge 
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